![if gte IE 9]><![endif]><![if gte IE 9]><![endif]><![if gte IE 9]><![endif]>
Thank You For Submiting Feedback!
One who steals money or property which itself had been stolen by another may be prosecuted notwithstanding the illegality of his victim's possession. Evidence of the general habits of a person is not admissible for the purpose of showing his conduct upon a specific occasion.
Appellant Milton M. Levin was convicted of the charge of grand larceny, under D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2201 (1961). Under the prosecution's theory, the appellant received money entrusted to an agent of a union, who was under indictment. The appellant allegedly represented that he would use the money to bribe court officials in the case against the agent but the appellant allegedly intended to appropriate the money for his own use. For his part, appellant argued that he could not be found guilty of larceny because he received the money from a third party who had stolen the money. Appellant thus challenged his conviction.
Was the appellant’s conviction for the offense of grand larceny, in violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2201 (1961) proper?
The court affirmed the appellant’s conviction on the ground that appellant's receipt of stolen money from a third party constituted grand larceny under D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2201 (1961). The court held that one could be prosecuted for stealing money notwithstanding the illegality of his victim's possession. Also, the court ruled that evidence demonstrating appellant's religious habits were properly limited because evidence of habit could not be admitted to establish a person's conduct on a specific occasion. Lastly, the court determined that appellant received a fair trial, thus, his conviction was affirmed.