Lindsey v. Normet - 405 U.S. 56, 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972)

Rule:

Since the purpose of the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.105-105.160, is constitutionally permissible and since the classification regarding tenants is rationally related to that purpose, the statute as a whole is not repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Facts:

Appellants, month-to-month tenants of appellee Normet, refused to pay their monthly rent unless certain substandard conditions were remedied, and appellee threatened eviction. Appellants filed a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer (FED) Statute was unconstitutional on its face, and an injunction against its continued enforcement. Appellants attacked principally (1) the requirement of trial no later than six days after service of the complaint unless security for accruing rent is provided, (2) the limitation of triable issues to the tenant's default, defenses based on the landlord's breach of duty to maintain the premises being precluded, and (3) the requirement of posting bond on appeal, with two sureties, in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending appellate decision, this bond to be forfeited if the lower court decision is affirmed. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the statute did not violate the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause.

Issue:

Did the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute violate the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution?

Answer:

Yes, but only with respect to the double bond prerequisite for appealing an FED action.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the double bond violated the equal protection clause because it required more of tenants bringing an appeal than it did of other litigants bringing appeals under Or. Rev. Stat. § 19.040, without any basis for the distinction. The Court held, however, that the expedited hearing procedure contained in the statute was constitutional because it advanced a valid state objective. The Court also held that the limitation on the issues that could be litigated at the hearing was permissible because the tenants could obtain redress of their repair issues in a separate suit.