Liteky v. United States - 510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994)

Rule:

Opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

Facts:

The defendants at a 1991 federal criminal trial were charged with willful destruction of United States property at a military reservation, with respect to what the defendants claimed had been a political protest. Before trial, the defendants moved to disqualify the presiding district judge pursuant to 28 USCS 455(a), relied on the same judge's conduct of a 1983 bench trial involving one of the 1991 defendants, a Catholic priest, for various misdemeanors allegedly committed during a prior protest at the same military reservation, and asserted that in the 1983 trial, the judge had displayed impatience, disregard for the defense, and animosity towards the priest, his codefendants, and their beliefs. The district judge, however, in denying the disqualification motion, expressed the view that matters arising from judicial proceedings were not a proper basis for recusal. At the close of the prosecution's case, the priest renewed his disqualification motion, adding as grounds the judge's admonishment, during the trial, of the priest's counsel and the priest's codefendants. The motion was again denied and the defendants were eventually convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings were not a proper basis for recusal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 

Issue:

Under the circumstances, should the district judge be disqualified pursuant to 28 USCS 455(a)? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that under § 455(a) recusal was required whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Court further held that under § 455(a), the presence of an extrajudicial source did not establish bias, and the absence of an extrajudicial source did not preclude bias. In addition, the opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, did not amount to bias or partiality unless they displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Finally, the Court held that when intrajudicial behavior was at issue, manifestations of animosity had to be much more than subtle to establish bias. Under these governing principles, the Court held that none of the grounds asserted by the defendants in the case at hand required the disqualification of the district judge pursuant to 455(a). Accordingly, the judgment denying petitioners' motion for recusal was affirmed.