Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach - 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018)

Rule:

An arrest deprived a person of essential liberties, but if there was probable cause to believe that the person committed a criminal offense there was often no recourse for the deprivation. Also, the First Amendment prohibited government officials from retaliating against individuals for engaging in protected speech.

Facts:

In 2006, petitioner Fane Lozman towed his floating home into a slip in a marina owned by the respondent City of Riviera Beach in Florida. Thereafter, petitioner became an outspoken critic of respondent’s plan to use its eminent domain power to seized waterfront homes for private development. Oftentimes, petitioner made critical comments about officials during the public-comment period of city council meetings. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that respondent Council's approval of an agreement with some developers violated Florida's open-meetings laws. Thus, the Council held a closed-door session to discuss the said lawsuit. Petitioner alleged that the meeting's transcript showed that councilmembers devised an official plan to intimidate him and that many of his subsequent disputes with city officials and employees were part of respondent’s retaliation plan. A few months later, a public meeting was held where petitioner began to speak about the arrests of officials from other jurisdictions. He refused to stop making his remarks, hence, he was carried out by the police officer as ordered by the council member. Respondent averred that petitioner was arrested for violating the City Council's rules of procedure by discussing issues unrelated to the City and then refusing to leave the podium. But petitioner claimed that his arrest was to retaliate for his lawsuit and his prior public criticisms of city officials. Petitioner was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence but was then released. The State attorney determined that there was probable cause for his arrest, but decided to dismiss the charges. Petitioner then filed suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 but the jury returned a verdict for the respondent. The jury was instructed by the district court that, for petitioner to prevail on his claim of retaliatory arrest at the meeting, he had to prove that the arresting officer was motivated by impermissible animus against his protected speech and that the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest. Petitioner appealed the judgment but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed concluding that the existence of probable cause defeated a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.

Issue:

Did the presence of probable cause bar petitioner’s retaliatory arrest claim?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court vacated the judgment and held that the fact that the arrest was made with probable cause did not bar petitioner’s retaliation claim. The court held that the fact that petitioner must prove the existence and enforcement of an official policy motivated by retaliation separated his claim from the typical retaliatory arrest claim. Hence, the court ruled that petitioner need not prove the absence of probable cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest against respondent. However, the court clarified that it was not to say that petitioner was ultimately entitled to relief or even a new trial. The court concluded that on remand, the lower court may apply the relevant precedents and may consider any arguments in support of the District Court’s judgment that have been preserved by the respondent City. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.