Maine v. Moulton - 474 U.S. 159, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985)

Rule:

The U.S. Const. amend. VI is violated when the state obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.

Facts:

Respondent and co-defendant were charged in a multi-count indictment with committing various criminal offenses. Both entered not guilty pleas and were released on bail pending trial. Co-defendant Colson later confessed to police and agreed to cooperate with the prosecution of respondent. Co-defendant was wired by police and met with respondent under the guise of discussing their pending charges and trial strategy. Respondent made several incriminating statements in this recorded conversation. The trial court denied respondent's pretrial motion to suppress the recorded statements he made to Colson as having been obtained in violation of respondent's right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments on the ground that the recordings were made for other reasons. Some of respondent's recorded incriminating statements made at the meeting with Colson were admitted in evidence, and respondent was convicted of burglary and theft. The appellate court remanded the matter for new trial, ruling the state could not use the statements. The State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, was the respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel violated, thereby warranting the suppression of the incriminating statements made by the respondent to his co-defendant during a meeting to plan defense strategy?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Court affirmed the ruling excluding the statements, holding that the respondent's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by him to Colson after indictment and at the meeting of the two to plan defense strategy for the upcoming trial. The Court noted that the assistance of counsel was necessary to safeguard the other procedural safeguards provided to the accused by the criminal justice process. Accordingly, the right to the assistance of counsel was not limited to participation in a trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself. In this case, the State clearly violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right when it arranged to record conversations between respondent and its undercover informant, Colson. When the police requested that Colson wear a body wire transmitter to the meeting with respondent, the police knew that respondent would make statements that he had a constitutional right not to make to their agent prior to consulting with counsel. By concealing the fact that Colson was an agent of the State, the police denied respondent the opportunity to consult with counsel and thus denied him the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.