Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. - 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021)

Rule:

The statutory scheme violates due process to the extent that it allows for general jurisdiction over foreign corporations, absent affiliations within the state that are so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in Pennsylvania. Compliance with Pennsylvania's mandatory registration requirement does not constitute voluntary consent to general personal jurisdiction. And the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects the defendant's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which the defendant has no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. A tribunal's authority depends upon the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 

Facts:

Under Pennsylvania law, a foreign corporation may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers with the Department of State of the Commonwealth. Further, qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth constituted a sufficient basis to enable Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Pursuant to these statutes, a plaintiff-appellant Robert Mallory, a Virginia resident, filed an action in Pennsylvania against appellee Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, alleging injuries in Virginia and Ohio. The plaintiff asserted that Pennsylvania courts have general personal jurisdiction over the case based exclusively upon the foreign corporation's registration to do business in the Commonwealth. The trial court held that our statutory scheme, affording Pennsylvania courts general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations that register to do business in the Commonwealth, regardless of the lack of continuous and systematic affiliations within the state that render the corporation essentially at home here, failed to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Further, the trial court reasoned that it would violate due process to construe a foreign corporation's compliance with our mandatory registration statute as voluntary consent to Pennsylvania courts' exercise of general personal jurisdiction. 

Issue:

Did the trial court correctly held that the statutory schemes affording Pennsylvania courts general personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations fail to comport with the Due Process Clause?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed the trial court’s order and held that the trial court correctly ordered the dismissal of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction because Pennsylvania's mandatory registration requirement was unconstitutional to the extent that it afforded Pennsylvania courts general jurisdiction over foreign corporations that were not at home in the Commonwealth as legislatively coerced consent to general jurisdiction was not voluntary consent.