Martin v. Fab-Con, Inc. - 9 F. Supp. 3d 642 (E.D. La. 2014)

Rule:

The statutory definition of a vessel includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. 1 U.S.C.S. § 3. Not every floating structure is a vessel. Instead, in order to determine whether a given artificial contrivance is a vessel, a court must determine whether a reasonable observer, looking to the structure's physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water. The determinative question is whether the watercraft's use as a means of transportation on water is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one. The structure need not be used primarily for the purpose of transportation over water; it need only be regularly used or practically designed for that purpose. In divining the purpose of the structure, courts are to consider only objective evidence of a waterborne transportation purpose, rather than the subjective intent of the owner.

Facts:

Plaintiff Michael Martin brought the present Jones Act claim for negligence and unseaworthiness against his employer, Fab-Con, Inc., based on an accident Martin allegedly sustained while working as a galley hand aboard the quarterbarge UNITY at Grand Bay Receiving Station. Plaintiff sought $1.5 million in damages for medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional stress, and loss of earning capacity, as well as maintenance and cure. Shortly after filing suit, Martin amended his complaint to include claims for negligence and unseaworthiness against Equipment Co., LLC, the owner of the UNITY, and Barges Unlimited, Inc. and CCR, Inc., the charterers of the UNITY. Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the barge upon which the plaintiff was working when he was injured was not a “vessel.”

Issue:

Was the barge upon which the plaintiff was working a “vessel,” thereby entitling the continuance of plaintiff’s complaint against defendants?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court first noted that it treated the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a motion for summary judgment since the issue of whether the barge was a vessel was intertwined with the merits of the case. With regard to the substance of the case, the court held that the barge upon which the plaintiff was working when he was injured was not a vessel within the meaning of 1 U.S.C.S. § 3 pursuant to Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S.Ct. 735, 740, 184 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2013), since the barge had no rudder or other steering mechanism, was incapable of self-propulsion, had remained stationary for most of the past several years, its interior was similar to living quarters on land, was incapable of moving under its own power, it never transported a crew or cargo, and was designed exclusively to house workers, serving as a floating hotel. Since the barge was not a vessel, plaintiff’s claims against defendants for unseaworthiness cannot succeed since unseaworthiness required the existence of a vessel. Moreover, the court held that plaintiff’s negligence claim cannot succeed since it could not satisfy the location test for admiralty jurisdiction. The court noted that when a plaintiff’s injury did not occur on a vessel, summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claim for negligence under the general maritime law was proper.