Mattox v. United States - 156 U.S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337 (1895)

Rule:

The fact that the attendance of the witness cannot be procured, or even that the witness himself is dead, does not dispense with the necessity of laying the proper foundation.

Facts:

Mattox was convicted of murder for a shooting that happened in November 1892. He appealed, alleging that the court erred in: 1) assuming jurisdiction of the case, 2) not remitting the indictment of the Circuit Court for Trial, 3) admitting to the jury the reporter’s notes of the testimony of two witnesses at the former trial, who had since died, and 4) refusing to permit him to introduce the testimony of two witnesses to impeach the testimony of one of the deceased witnesses.

Issue:

Did the court err in refusing Mattox to introduce the testimony of two witnesses to impeach the testimony of one of the deceased prosecution witnesses?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

It was previously held that, if the statements came to the knowledge of counsel afterwards and before the trial, it was his duty to apply for a commission or move a postponement until the evidence could be procured. "The mere absence of the witness," said the court, "has never been considered a reason for allowing his unsworn statements to be proved in order to affect his credibility." It seemed to the court that to allow the death of the witness to work an exception would be to destroy the principle upon which the rule rests, and deny the protection which it was designed to afford. In relieving one party of a supposed hardship an equally serious one might be inflicted upon the other. Without, therefore, the opportunity to the witness of explanation, or, to the party against whom offered, of reexamination the supposed declarations lack the elements of credibility which they should possess before they can be used legitimately to destroy the testimony of the witness. In Craft v. Commonwealth, 81 Kentucky, 250, it was held that where the testimony of a witness, given upon a former trial, was reproduced, the witness having died, testimony to the effect that the witness, subsequent to the former trial, stated that the evidence given by him on that trial was false, was not competent. The rule was put upon the ground that if the impeaching statements were admitted there would be a strong temptation to the fabrication of testimony, by which important and true evidence might be destroyed. So in Hubbard v. Briggs, N.Y. 518, 536, the testimony of a deceased witness given on a former trial of the case was read in evidence. Subsequently the defendant offered to read the deposition of this witness in a chancery suit, for the purpose of contradicting his evidence as read, and impeaching him. The testimony was held to have been properly ruled out, no foundation having been laid for it. The fact that the witness was dead was held not to change the rule. While the enforcement of the rule, in case of the death of the witness subsequent to his examination, may work an occasional hardship by depriving the party of the opportunity of proving the contradictory statements, a relaxation of the rule in such cases would offer a temptation to perjury, and the fabrication of testimony, which, in criminal cases especially, would be almost irresistible. The fact that one party has lost the power of contradicting his adversary's witness was really no greater hardship to him than the fact that his adversary has lost the opportunity of recalling his witness and explaining his testimony would be to him. There was quite as much danger of doing injustice to one-party by admitting such testimony as to the other by excluding it.