May v. City of Arlington - Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-1674-L, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54189 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2018)

Rule:

A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. A governmental entity cannot be liable for civil rights violations under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Official policy is defined as: 1) A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the city lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or 2) A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents city policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the city or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.

Facts:

In an Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs (Jordan May, Jasmine May, and Ava May as next of kin of Juan O'Neil May, decedent; and Jindia May Blunt, individually and as representative of the estate of Juan May, deceased), asserted claims against the City of Arlington (the "City") and Thedrick Andres ("Andres") as a result of the shooting death of Juan O'Neil May. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted claims against the City and Andres under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"); claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act; claims for wrongful death under Texas law; a survival claim under Texas law; a civil rights claim under § 1983 for violation of familial relationship; claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, costs of court and attorney's fees. The City and Andres have both filed second motions to dismiss. First, the City contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficiently that a policy or custom of the City caused any of them to be deprived of a constitutional right. Second, the City contended it is immune from the intentional torts under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Third, the City contended that Plaintiffs' claims for assault under § 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Fourth, the City contended that Plaintiffs' claims for exemplary and punitive damages under federal and state law should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, the City contended that Jindia Blunt, sister of Juan May, did not have standing to bring any claims in her individual capacity and that any claim in such capacity should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Andres contended that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint did not address the shortcomings previously identified by the court and that it does not provide specific allegations to defeat Andres's qualified immunity defense. Andres contended that Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force should be dismissed because it does not meet the pleading requirements set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Andres also contended that Plaintiffs' claims under Texas Tort Claims Act are barred against him because they also chose to sue the City and their claims are barred by an immediate, irrevocable statutory election pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, § 101.106. He further contended that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress fail because it is a "gap-filler" and there is no gap to fill in this case. He also contended that the § 1983 claim for violation of familial relationship should be dismissed. Andres requests that Plaintiffs be required to amend and replead, and address Andres's qualified immunity defense by submitting a Rule 7 Reply.

Issue:

Was the City’s motion to dismiss a municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 meritorious?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court denied the City’s motion to dismiss in a municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983  and plaintiffs were allowed one last time to replead since the allegations made regarding the claim were extremely conclusory and short on specificity, which did not meet the pleading requirements necessary to state a claim for municipal liability. The court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for exemplary and punitive damages against the city because a municipality was immune from an award of punitive damages for actions brought under § 1983 and likewise, plaintiffs were barred from recovering exemplary damages on state claim claims. A wrongful death claim made by a plaintiff's surviving sibling in her individual capacity was dismissed because a sibling was not one of the persons authorized to brought a wrongful death claim in her individual capacity under the state law.