Minneci v. Pollard - 565 U.S. 118, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012)

Rule:

Where a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law, the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law. A federal court cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.

Facts:

Respondent Pollard sought damages from employees at a privately run federal prison in California, claiming that they had deprived him of adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Federal District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Eighth Amendment did not imply an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, against a privately-managed prison's personnel. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the employees appealed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contending that creating an implied action under the Eighth Amendment was not warranted in view of existing state law remedies.

Issue:

Was the creation of an implied action under the Eight Amendment warranted, notwithstanding the existence of state law remedies?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The U.S. Supreme Court held that no new federal remedy could be implied since state tort law authorized adequate alternative damages actions, providing both significant deterrence and compensation. The Court noted that respondent’s claim focused on a kind of conduct that typically fell within the scope of traditional state tort law and, in the case of the private rather than government employees, state tort law provided an alternative, existing process capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake. Further, it appeared that all states provided actions for a claim such as that of the respondent, the fact that a state law might prove less generous than an implied federal action did not render the state process inadequate, and state tort law and a potential implied federal remedy were not required to be perfectly congruent.