Monasky v. Taglieri - 140 S. Ct. 719 (2020)

Rule:

In accord with decisions of the courts of other countries party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11 (Treaty Doc.), the U.S. Supreme Court holds that a child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. An actual agreement between the parents is not necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence. The Supreme Court further holds that a first-instance habitual-residence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error.

Facts:

Petitioner Monasky, a U. S. citizen, asserted that her Italian husband, respondent Taglieri, became abusive after the couple moved to Italy from the United States. Two months after the birth of the couple's daughter, A.M.T., in Italy, Monasky fled with the infant to Ohio. Respondent petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for A.M.T.'s return to Italy under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that the child had been wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence.” The District Court granted the respondent’s petition, concluding that the parents' shared intent was for their daughter to live in Italy. Then two-year-old A.M.T. was returned to Italy. The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s argument that Italy could not qualify as A.M.T.'s “habitual residence” in the absence of an actual agreement by her parents to raise her there. Certiorari was granted. 

Issue:

1. Could Italy qualify as A. M. T.’s “habitual residence” in the absence of an actual agreement by her parents to raise her there?
2. Should the Court of Appeals have reviewed the District Court’s habitual residence determination independently rather than deferentially?

Answer:

1) Yes. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was affirmed. In accord with decisions of the courts of other countries party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11 (Treaty Doc.), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a child’s habitual residence depended on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, and that an actual agreement between the parents was not necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence. The Supreme Court further held that a first-instance habitual-residence determination was subject to deferential appellate review for clear error. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the judgment below. The parties agreed that their dispute required no further factual development, and neither party asked for a remand. Final judgment on the child's return was in order.