Moser v. United States Steel Corp. - 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)

Rule:

The rights of the surface owner to subjacent support and his right to the use of the top-soil in its place would have to be respected, and at the same time, the owner of the mineral fee should have a right of extraction. Since the right of extraction could only be exercised by destruction of the surface owner's enjoyment, it could only be accomplished with compensation for the damages to the surface estate. Specific mention of the substance, however, together with the usual provisions for extraction, would demonstrate a specific intention to make the surface right subject to the rights of access for purposes of extraction and would not make the mineral owner accountable for necessary damage flowing therefrom.

Facts:

The Mosers, plaintiffs, and the Gefferts, defendants, own neighboring tracts of land in Live Oak County. Prior to 1949, the boundary between the Mosers' land and that of the Gefferts was a winding road. In 1949, the road was straightened and, as a result, no longer represented the true boundary between the two ranches. The new road separated a 6.77 acre tract of the Geffert ranch on the Moser's side of the road and a 6.42 acre tract of the Moser ranch on the Geffert's side of the road. To avoid crossing the highway to reach their tracts, the Mosers' predecessor in title and the Gefferts executed similar deeds conveying the surface estates of the isolated tracts to the other party. The 1949 deeds contain identical language reserving “[A]ll of the oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and character, in, on, under and that may be produced from said tract of land, together with all necessary and convenient easements for the purpose of exploring for, mining, drilling, producing and transporting oil, gas or any of said minerals.” Substantial quantities of uranium were discovered on the 6.77 acre tract. The Mosers, as surface owners of the 6.77 acre tract, sued the Gefferts to establish ownership of the uranium. The Gefferts, as owners of the mineral estate under the 6.77 acre tract, counterclaimed to establish that uranium is one of the "other minerals" reserved from the conveyance of the surface. At trial, the parties offered conflicting evidence on the depth of the uranium deposits and the effect its removal would have on the surface. The jury found there would have been no substantial surface destruction at the time the deed was executed. The trial court accordingly held the uranium was a part of the mineral estate retained by the Gefferts in the 1949 deed. In adjudging as such, the trial court used Reed v. Wylie (1977) (Reed I) wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that if substantial quantities of the mineral lie so near the surface that extraction, as of the date of the severance of the surface and mineral estates, would necessarily have destroyed the surface, the surface owner has title to the mineral. Prior to final disposition of the court of civil appeals, the Texas Supreme Court promulgated Reed v. Wylie (1980) (Reed II) which modified Reed I. Under said jurisprudence, a substance "near the surface" is a part of the surface estate if it is shown that any reasonable method of production, at the time of conveyance or thereafter, would consume, deplete, or destroy the surface. The civil court of appeals used Reed II and affirmed.

Issue:

Is uranium included in a reservation or conveyance of “oil, gas and other minerals”?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

In Texas, the mineral estate may be severed from the surface estate by a grant of the minerals in a deed or lease, or by reservation in a conveyance. This severance is often accomplished by a grant or reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals." Consequently, Texas courts have had many occasions to construe the scope of the term "other minerals." The Court has determined that some unnamed substances have been impliedly conveyed or reserved in mineral conveyances by cataloging each, on a substance-by-substance basis, as part of the surface or mineral estate as a matter of law. In making these determinations of ownership, our courts have considered a number of construction aids. The Court has refused to employ the ejusdem generis rule of construction to limit the term "oil, gas and other minerals" to hydrocarbons. Likewise, we have acknowledged that the scientific or technical definition of a disputed substance is not determinative of whether it is a mineral, because the term "other minerals" would then "embrace not only metallic minerals, oil, gas, stone, sand, gravel, and many other substances, but even the soil itself." Such a construction would eliminate any distinction between the surface and the mineral estates. The Court has, however, approved of considering whether the substance is thought to be a mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term. The knowledge of the parties of the value, or even the existence of the substance at the time the conveyance was executed has been found to be irrelevant to its inclusion or exclusion from a grant of minerals. Thus, severance of minerals in an oil, gas and other minerals clause includes all substances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or value is known at the time of severance. In the instant case, Uranium is a mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word and was retained in the Gefferts' conveyance of the 6.77 acre tract to the Mosers.