Newton v. Rumery - 480 U.S. 386, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987)

Rule:

Some release-dismissal agreements may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision. The risk, publicity, and expense of a criminal trial may intimidate a defendant, even if he believes his defense is meritorious. But this possibility does not justify invalidating all such agreements. In other contexts, criminal defendants are required to make difficult choices that effectively waive constitutional rights. For example, plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution even though a guilty plea waives important constitutional rights. There is no reason to believe that release-dismissal agreements pose a more coercive choice than other situations the courts accepted. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.

Facts:

The chief of police of a New Hampshire town arrested respondent businessman for tampering with a witness--the alleged victim of an aggravated sexual assault by a friend of the respondent. After the respondent retained an attorney, and discussions ensued, the respondent signed a written release-dismissal agreement, pursuant to which the respondent released any claims he might have against the petitioners - the town, its officials, or the alleged victim, if a New Hampshire prosecutor dismissed the criminal charges. The criminal charges were dropped, but, several months later, the respondent filed an action under 42 USCS 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The respondent alleged federal and state law claims, including assertions that the town and its officers had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him, defaming him, and imprisoning him falsely. The District Court, however, rejected the respondent’s argument that the release-dismissal agreement was unenforceable because it violated public policy, and granted a motion to dismiss, based upon the affirmative defense of the release-dismissal agreement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and expressed the view that a covenant not to sue public officials for an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, executed in exchange for a decision not to prosecute criminal charges, was void ab initio as against public policy. Petitioners sought review by certiorari. 

Issue:

Was the release-dismissal agreement enforceable, thereby warranting the dismissal of respondent’s suit against petitioners? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Court rejected a per se rule because release-dismissal agreements did not pose a more coercive choice than other situations involving waiver of constitutional rights. The Court considered that respondent was a sophisticated businessman, he was not in jail and was represented by an experienced criminal lawyer who drafted the agreement, and he contemplated the agreement for three days before signing it. Thus, because respondent voluntarily waived his right to sue, the agreement was enforceable.