Nixon v. Clay - 2019 UT 32, 449 P.3d 11 (Sup.Ct.)

Rule:

Voluntary participants in sports have no duty of care to avoid contact that is inherent in the activity.

Facts:

Judd Nixon and Edward Clay were playing on opposite teams in a church-sponsored recreational basketball game, during the course of which, Clay’s arm made contact with Nixon’s shoulder, resulting in the latter’s knee injury. Three years later, Nixon filed a complaint alleging that Clay’s negligence caused his knee injury. Clay filed a motion for summary judgment two years into the litigation. Clay asked the district court to adopt a "contact sports exception" recognized in many jurisdictions. Alternatively, he argued that no jury could find that he acted negligently based on the undisputed facts. The district court granted Clay's motion for summary judgment on both grounds. It adopted a "contact sports exception" that provided that participants in bodily contact sports were liable for injuries only when the injuries were the result of conduct that demonstrated a “willful” or “reckless disregard for the safety of the other player.” Applying this test, the court first determined that basketball was a contact sport. Then it determined that Nixon's injury was not the result of "willful" or "reckless" conduct, but conduct inherent and foreseeable in the game of basketball; hence, the contact sports exception shielded Clay from liability. The court also applied the test articulated in B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, 275 P.3d 228, and held, in the alternative, that no reasonable jury could find that Clay acted negligently. Nixon appealed. 

Issue:

1. Under the circumstances, was Clay liable for Nixon’s knee injury? 
2. Was the district court correct in adopting a “contact sports exception” in analyzing the instant case? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The Court rejected the "contact sports exception" endorsed by the district court and established in a majority of other courts—an exception that turned on a defendant’ state of mind and on whether an activity qualified as a “contact sport.” The Court instead held that voluntary participants in sports had no duty of care to avoid contact that was inherent in the activity. Applying this exception to the undisputed facts, the Court concluded that Clay’s conduct – “reaching in” and “swiping at the basketball” – was inherent in the game of basketball; thus, he has no duty of care to avoid such contact. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.