Osier v. Osier - 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980)

Rule:

When it appears to a divorce court that an appropriate determination of custody will involve inquiry into the consequences of the religious practices of one of the parents, such court must be alert to the impact that its order concerning care and custody may have on that parent's fundamental rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the religious freedom clause of Me. Const. art. I, § 3. First and foremost among the rights so implicated is the right to religious liberty, which, along with other First Amendment guarantees, occupies a "preferred position" in the Constitution. Second, any decision terminating or limiting the right of a parent to physical custody of his child also affects his constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining his familial relationship with the child.

Facts:

At the time it granted a divorce to plaintiff Jay Osier on June 24, 1976, the District Court entered no order concerning the care and custody of the couple's son, then four years of age. The father, a Navy flight engineer whose military duties required him to be absent from his Maine home about one third of the year, was unable to care for the child and agreed that the mother, Barbara Osier, should retain physical custody of him. After remarrying and setting up a new home, the father, by a motion seeking amendment of the divorce decree, requested custody of the child. At the hearings, one reason advanced by the father in support of his motion was that the mother would not consent to a blood transfusion for their son. The divorce court entered an order granting custody of the child to the father and his present wife with visitation rights to the mother, finding that the mother's religious practice in regard to blood transfusions raised an issue of major importance. According to the divorce court, the mother’s religious beliefs were such that they would endanger the physical well-being or life of the child. On mother’s appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court. She then took a timely appeal to the Law Court, arguing that the First Amendment guarantee of religious liberty prohibited the divorce court from taking her religious practices into account in determining custody unless such practices posed an immediate and substantial threat to the temporal well-being of the child. In response, the father argued that the blood transfusion issue was only one among several factors favoring him as the proper custodial parent and that the custody order should therefore be affirmed as resting on other grounds.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, did the court properly grant the custody of the child to the father?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court vacated the judgments by the trial court because it concluded from the record that the district court in granting custody to the father gave undue weight to the fact that the mother as a Jehovah's Witness would not consent to a blood transfusion for the son. Moreover, the court rejected the father's argument as it did not find any alternative grounds stated in the district court's opinion. On the contrary, the district court plainly considered the mother's announced religious practice concerning blood transfusions to be the dispositive issue.