Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772 - 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

Rule:

Likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1025(d), is a legal determination based upon factual underpinnings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determines the question on a case-specific basis, applying the thirteen In re E.I. DuPont factors without deference. At the same time, the court reviews factual underpinnings for that legal conclusion, namely the DuPont factors, for substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person might find that the evidentiary record supports the agency's conclusion.

Facts:

Appellant, an American wine importer, filed an intent to use trademark application under § 1(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(b), for the mark "VEUVE ROYALE" for its sparkling wine. The competitor filed an opposition with the Board, alleging a likelihood of confusion with its own marks for similar wines. The United States Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refused registration of the appellant’s trademarks on the ground of likelihood of confusion with three of the competitor’s marks. The appellant sought review of the decision. 

Issue:

Should the Board have allowed the registration of the "VEUVE ROYALE" trademark? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Board did not err in finding a likelihood of confusion, and affirmed the Board's refusal to register the "VEUVE ROYALE" trademark. The court found that "VEUVE" was an arbitrary term as applied to champagne and thus conceptually strong as a trademark, and distinctive, so its presence in both parties' marks enhanced the likelihood of confusion. Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding. The competitor had advertised its products heavily.