People v. Weisberg - 265 Cal. App. 2d 476, 71 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968)

Rule:

Malice "aforethought" merely means malice at the time of the killing; it need not be a preexisting state of mind. This distinguishes it from the premeditation, or deliberate purpose, required for first-degree murder. "Malice" in murder is not used in the popular sense of hatred or ill will. It may exist even though there is no actual intent to kill; e.g. where the intent is only to cause serious injury, or the killing is in the perpetration of a felony or other unlawful act dangerous to human life. Thus the presence or absence of "malice aforethought" has come to be determined oftentimes by artificial or technical reasoning, and not always by a simple reference to the actual intent to kill, as made manifest by the circumstances proved in each case. And the crime is equally murder where the malice aforethought is expressly proved and where it is implied, as from the killing in the absence of considerable provocation, or from such wanton recklessness, on the part of the slayer, as shows an abandoned and malignant heart. It does not follow, merely because the defendant might not perhaps have entertained any personal ill-will toward the deceased, that the shooting and killing of the latter was not with the malice essential to the consummation of the crime of murder.

Facts:

Gerald Weisberg and defendant Muriel Rita Weisberg were husband and wife during the events with which we are concerned. Two children were born as the issue of the marriage, namely Sharon, a girl, born on November 11, 1964, and David born on March 1, 1966. Defendant Rita had the care of the two children. David died on April 19, 1966, at about 10:25 a.m. in a local hospital. An autopsy disclosed that death resulted from a massive intra-cranial hemorrhage, caused by two skull fractures. The fractures caused contusion of the brain and the lacerating of the blood vessels in the brain. David was about seven weeks old at the time of death. The evidence indicated that David had a broken leg that was not self-inflicted as claimed by Muriel. Muriel was charged with murdering David. Muriel pleaded not guilty and in a nonjury trial Muriel was found guilty of murder of the second degree. Muriel was sentenced to the state prison.

Issue:

Was the evidence sufficient to show malice aforethought and support a judgment of second-degree murder?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that the evidence of David’s injuries were properly admitted because they showed a peculiar behavior pattern by Muriel and tended to identify her as the perpetrator of the charged crime. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to show malice aforethought and support a judgment of second-degree murder. The court stated that Muriel at least acted with intent to inflict serious injury. The court noted that the seven-week-old boy had suffered at different times a chip fracture of the leg, broken ribs, and skull fractures. The court concluded that such treatment of a baby of that age was ample to warrant the conclusion that Muriel acted with intent to inflict serious injury. Further, the court indicated that there was ample evidence to sustain the verdict that in effect determined that Muriel had an abandoned and malignant heart and did without provocation or justification kill her son.