Pulliam v. Allen - 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984)

Rule:

The Supreme Court has never had a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has a chilling effect on judicial independence. None of the seminal opinions on judicial immunity, either in England or in the United States, have involved immunity from injunctive relief. No court of appeals ever has concluded that immunity bars injunctive relief against a judge. At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity bar to such relief, and in situations where in their judgment an injunction against a judicial officer is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner's constitutional rights, courts will grant that relief.

Facts:

After Respondents, Richmond R. Allen and Jesse W. Nicholson, were arrested for non-jailable misdemeanors, Petitioner Gladys Pulliam, a Magistrate in a Virginia county, imposed bail, and when respondents were unable to meet the bail petitioner committed them to jail. Subsequently, respondents brought an action against petitioner in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that petitioner's practice of imposing bail on persons arrested for non-jailable offenses under Virginia law and of incarcerating those persons if they could not meet the bail was unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia enjoined the practice and also awarded the plaintiffs costs and attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 USCS 1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the award of attorney's fees, rejecting the magistrate's claim that such award should have been barred by principles of judicial immunity. 

Issue:

1. Would judicial immunity bar any prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer? 
2. Would judicial immunity bar the award of attorney’s fees under 42 USCS 1988? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The Court found that the case raised issues concerning the scope of judicial immunity from a civil suit that sought injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, specifically 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, and from fee awards made under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988. The Court held that judicial immunity was not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity. Injunctive relief was permissible in order to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner's constitutional rights. The Court then addressed the question of whether judicial immunity barred an award of attorney's fees, under § 1988, to one who succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief against a judicial officer, and it held that judicial immunity was no bar to such an award.