Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin - 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985)

Rule:

The fundamental difference between negligent injury, or even grossly negligent injury, and intentional injury is the specific intent to inflict injury. Intent means that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. 

Facts:

Mrs. Judy Copelin sued Reed Tool Company for loss of consortium resulting from on-the-job injuries sustained by her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment for Reed Tool Company on the ground that Mrs. Copelin's action was derivative and could not be maintained because her husband's suit was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 8306-8309i (Vernon 1967 and Supp. 1985). This court has held that if Mrs. Copelin could establish an intentional impairment of consortium, her claim would not be barred by either the act or her husband's acceptance of workers' compensation benefits. On remand Reed Tool again moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning intentional injury. The trial court granted summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for trial.

Issue:

May Reed Tool be held to have intentionally injured the employee?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court reversed the lower court's decision and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Reed Tool, finding that the suit was barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act because there was no proof that Reed Tool had intentionally caused the injury. Although Copelin had alleged that Reed Tool intentionally caused her husband's injury by requiring him to work an unsafe machine, by inadequately training him, and by forcing him to work excessive hours, the court held that intentional failure to furnish a safe place to work did not rise to the level of intentional injury except when the employer believed his conduct was substantially certain to cause the injury. Turning to the question of whether summary judgment for Reed Tool was proper, the court concluded it was, writing that although Copelin’s evidence might raise questions of fact concerning gross negligence, it did not raise a question of fact that Reed Tool knew with substantial certainty that Copelin’s husband would be injured.