Riley v. United States - No. C19-1522 JLR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64513 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2020)

Rule:

The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow prisoners to directly petition a district court for compassionate release, removing the BOP's prior exclusive gatekeeper role for such motions. The statute now provides the court with authority to reduce a sentence upon the motion of a defendant if three conditions are met: (1) the inmate has either exhausted his or her administrative appeal rights of BOP's failure to bring such a motion on the inmate's behalf or has waited until 30 days after the applicable warden has received such a request; (2) the inmate has established "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for the requested sentence reduction; and (3) the reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement.

Facts:

On April 14, 2014, the Government charged Mr. Riley with distribution of heroin, possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of 100 grams or more of heroin with intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. On September 21, 2016, the Government filed a superseding indictment, which added two more charges of possession of firearms as a convicted felon. The charges in the superseding indictment included seven offenses related to distribution and possession of drugs [Counts 1-3] and unlawful possession of multiple firearms [Counts 4-7].

On September 24, 2014, the court found Mr. Riley was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him mentally incompetent to stand trial and ordered him hospitalized to determine whether his competency could be restored. Nearly one year later, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") issued a certificate of restoration of competency to stand trial and submitted a psychiatric evaluation and report. The court then scheduled Mr. Riley's trial for November 28, 2016. Mr. Riley eventually pleaded guilty to Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the superseding indictment [2 counts re: possession of drugs, 1 count re: possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime]. Under Mr. Riley's plea agreement, the Government agreed to dismiss counts 1 and counts 5-7 and to reduce the drug quantity allegations in counts 2 and 3, which had the effect of eliminating the mandatory minimum sentence for those counts. The five-year consecutive mandatory minimum sentence remained in place as to Count 4. Under the plea agreement, the Government also agreed to recommend a sentence no higher than 180 months (15 years) and Mr. Riley agreed to recommend a sentence of not less than 96 months (8 years).

On March 17, 2017, Mr. Riley filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was misadvised by his defense counsel when his attorney told him that he would face a mandatory term of 30 years if he was convicted of both Counts 4 and 7 of the superseding indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Mr. Riley claimed that this advice was incorrect because the predicate acts underlying the two counts were not sufficiently distinct because both cited counts 1-3 as predicate drug trafficking crimes, and therefore, he argued that the counts would have merged for sentencing purposes. The Government opposed Mr. Riley's motion maintaining that controlling Ninth Circuit authority foreclosed Mr. Riley's argument. The Beltran-Moreno court held that the Government was entitled to charge the defendants with two separate § 924(c) counts, and after the defendants pleaded guilty to those counts, the district court was required to impose consecutive minimum sentences of five and twenty-five years on top of the ten-year mandatory minimum that attached to the drug charges. This court accepted the Government's argument in response to Mr. Riley's motion on that basis. Accordingly, the court concluded that Mr. Riley did not receive incorrect legal advice and denied Mr. Riley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, on June 27, 2017, the court sentenced Mr. Riley to a 15-year term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.

On June 29, 2017, Mr. Riley timely filed a notice of appeal. Mr. Riley raised the same issue on appeal that he raised in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. Riley argued again that his counsel was ineffective because his attorney provided incorrect legal advice about the penalties he faced if he were convicted of both the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts as charged in the superseding indictment. Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Riley's argument. Mr. Riley thus filed the instant habeas corpus petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on September 23, 2019. During the pendency of the proceedings, he filed multiple motions, including a motion for compassionate release based on his diagnosis of HIV-AIDS that made his health drastically deteriorate.

Issue:

Should the court grant Mr. Riley’s motion for compassionate release based on extraordinary and compelling reasons?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

Mr. Riley bears the burden of establishing that compelling and extraordinary reasons exist that justify compassionate release. The Government argues that Mr. Riley has not met his burden because he is not suffering from a "terminal illness" and none of his medical conditions "substantially diminish" his ability "to provide self-care" within the facility in which he is confined, and thus he cannot meet the strictures of subpart (A) of the Sentencing Commission's application note. Indeed, Mr. Riley has not shown that the facility in which he is confined is failing to adequately manage either his HIV/AIDS diagnosis or his prostate cancer. these medical conditions, standing alone, do not justify an order requiring Mr. Riley's release.

Further, the Government argues that the present crisis surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic adds nothing to Mr. Riley's motion. Although Mr. Riley argues that his underlying health conditions make him more vulnerable to COVID-19, he has not contracted a COVID-19 infection; and so, ultimately, Mr. Riley relies on the possibility that he may become infected with COVID-19 while confined to justify his release. However, the court agrees with the Government that "[g]eneral concerns about possible exposure to COVID-19 do not meet the criteria for extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence set forth in the Sentencing Commission's policy statement on compassionate release." The court does not discount the dangers associated with COVID-19 at a detention facility like Butner FCM. However, as the Government points out, BOP has protocols in place to combat the spread of infectious diseases and a detailed plan specifically for COVID-19. Further, Mr. Riley has not presented any evidence indicating that BOP is not reasonably equipped to handle the challenge of COVID-19 or to provide him with appropriate medical care if he should become sick. As discussed above, to establish "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduction in his sentence, Mr. Riley must show that he is suffering from either a terminal illness or a "serious physical or mental condition . . . that substantially diminishes" his "ability . . . to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he is not expected to recover." Those circumstances, however, are not met by the mere elevated risk of contracting a pandemic virus in prison, even if such a higher risk exists. The compassionate release provision of § 3582(c)(1) does not authorize the court to release an inmate prophylactically on the mere possibility that he may contract a virus or to modify his sentence based on the mere existence of COVID-19. There may be factual circumstances involving COVID-19 in a prison or other detention facility that would warrant the modification of an inmate's sentence under § 3582(c)(1), but those circumstances are not presently before this court.