Roe v. Flores-Ortega - 528 U.S. 470, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000)

Rule:

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. This test applies to claims that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.

Facts:

Respondent pleaded guilty in a California court to second-degree murder. At sentencing, the trial judge advised the respondent that there were 60 days for him to file an appeal. While the respondent’s counsel wrote “bring appeal papers” in a file, no notice of appeal was filed within that time. The respondent’s following attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely, and efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Subsequently, the respondent filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of the attorney's failure to file the notice of appeal after allegedly promising to do so. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied relief. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the respondent was entitled to relief because, under the Court of Appeals’ precedent, a habeas corpus petitioner needed only to show that counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner’s consent. A writ of certiorari was granted. 

Issue:

Did the circumstances establish that the counsel was constitutionally ineffective, thereby entitling respondent to a habeas corpus relief? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Strickland v Washington (1984) 466 US 668, 80 L Ed 2d 674, 104 S Ct 2052, provided the proper framework for evaluating a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal, as, among other matters, (1) counsel had a constitutionally imposed duty to consult the criminal defendant only when there was reason to think either that (a) a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal, or (b) a particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing; and (2) the defendant was required to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, the defendant would have timely appealed. In the instant case, the court of appeals failed to engage in the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry. Based on the record, the Court was unable to determine whether respondent's counsel had a duty to consult with respondent, whether she satisfied her obligations, and, if she did not, whether respondent was prejudiced thereby.