Ross v. Hartman - 78 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14 (1943)

Rule:

If one is negligent in leaving a motor vehicle improperly secured, if as a result thereof and in immediate sequence therewith some other event occurs, which would not have occurred except for such negligence, and if injury follows, such a one is responsible, even though the negligent act comes first in order of time. But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, the courts do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no reason to ignore and does not ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. The courts have applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving.

Facts:

The owner's agent violated a traffic ordinance by leaving the owner's truck unattended in a public alley, with the ignition unlocked and the key in the switch. Within two hours an unknown person drove the truck away and negligently ran over the victim. The trial court duly directed a verdict for the appellee on the authority of Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (1916). On facts essentially similar to the present case, and despite the presence of a similar ordinance, the court held that the defendant's act in leaving the car unlocked was not a "proximate" or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury because the wrongful act of a third person intervened. Plaintiff victim appealed. 

Issue:

Under the circumstances, could the vehicle owner be held liable for injuries sustained by the victim, notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle was stolen and driven by a thief? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court could not reconcile the decision in Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (1916) with facts which have become clearer and principles which have become better established than they were in 1916, and overruled that decision. The court reversed the trial court, finding that violation of a safety ordinance was negligence that created the hazard and thereby brought about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent. It was therefore a legal or "proximate" cause of the harm. The fact that the intermeddler's conduct was itself a proximate cause of the harm, and was probably criminal, was immaterial.