Rowe v. State Bank - 247 Ill. App. 3d 686, 187 Ill. Dec. 312, 617 N.E.2d 520 (1993)

Rule:

Summary judgment is improper where circumstances create a triable issue of fact as to whether the danger of criminal conduct by individuals possessing passkeys was sufficiently probable and predictable to create a duty upon the defendants to take reasonable precautionary measures, and whether their failure to do so was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages.

Facts:

This appeal arose from a negligence action filed by plaintiffs, Lori Rowe and Andrew Serpico, for the wrongful death and personal injuries occurring to decedent, Bonnie Serpico, and Rowe while on property owned and managed by defendants State Bank of Lombard et al. Plaintiff victim and the deceased were working the night shift when an intruder entered the office, held the women at gunpoint, and shot both women, one of whom died. Plaintiff victim and the estate representative alleged that the defendants breached a duty to notify the tenants that master and grand master keys to the office complex were outstanding and unaccounted for. The defendants argued that they had no duty to protect the plaintiff victim and the deceased from an intruder's criminal acts. A jury in the circuit court rendered a verdict for defendants. On appeal, the victim and the estate representative alleged that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, in admitting hearsay evidence and evidence of intruder's admissions, and in permitting property owners to dismiss their action against the intruder for indemnification after the trial began. 

Issue:

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motions for summary judgment pointing out that defendants were under no duty to protect the plaintiff from the criminal actions of an intruder?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed the decision but reversed and concluded that there were questions of fact with respect to certain matters which would give rise to the creation of a duty which could lead to a judgment favoring plaintiffs if the breach of such a duty proximately caused plaintiffs' damages. The court held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, but did err in admission of evidence and dismissal of the intruder. The court determined that pursuant to Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 239, the trial court gave the Illinois pattern jury instructions. The admissions and declarations against interest were not those of the plaintiff victim and estate representative. The defendant introduced other evidence controlled by the admissions. The court remanded to the trial court for a new trial.