Scheidler v. NOW, Inc. - 537 U.S. 393, 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003)

Rule:

The Hobbs Act defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951(b)(2).

Facts:

NOW, Inc., an organization that supports the legal availability of abortion and two facilities that perform abortions, filed a class action alleging that petitioners, individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, § 1951. In concluding that petitioners violated RICO's civil provisions, the jury found, among other things, that petitioners' alleged pattern of racketeering activity included violations of, or attempts or conspiracy to violate, the Hobbs Act, state extortion law, and the Travel Act, § 1952. The jury awarded damages, and the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against petitioners. Affirming in relevant part, the Seventh Circuit held, inter alia, that the things respondents claimed were extorted from them -- the class women's right to seek medical services from the clinics, the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, and the clinics' rights to conduct their business -- constituted "property" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. The Court of Appeals further held that petitioners "obtained" that property, as § 1951(b)(2) requires. The court also upheld the issuance of the nationwide injunction, finding that private plaintiffs are entitled to obtain injunctive relief under § 1964(c).

Issue:

Did the participants’ alleged conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics constitute extortion under Hobbs Act (18 USCS 1951)?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The United States Supreme Court held that, even though the abortion opponents' activities deprived the supporters of their ability to exercise their property right to lawful abortions, such deprivation did not by itself constitute extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act since the opponents did not obtain any property from the supporters. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion by using force or threats of force to restrict the supporters' actions, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell. Thus, they did not commit extortion.