Schlesinger v. Ballard - 419 U.S. 498, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975)

Rule:

It is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. The responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that business rests with Congress (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14) and with the President (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). The Court cannot say that, in exercising its broad constitutional power requiring the discharge of male officers pursuant to 10 U.S.C.S. § 6382(a), Congress has violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Facts:

After more than nine years of active service, plaintiff Robert Ballard, a Navy lieutenant, was discharged under the mandatory requirements of 10 USCS 6382(a) because he had failed, for a second time, to be selected for promotion. He brought the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, claiming that if he had been a woman officer, he would have been subject to the different separation statute in 10 USCS 6401(a), under which a woman Navy officer was entitled to 13 years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge for want of promotion; he claimed that the application of 6382 to him, when compared with the treatment of woman officers subject to 6401, was an unconstitutional discrimination based on sex in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge District Court, granting an appropriate injunction against the Navy, held that 6382 was unconstitutional because the 13-year tenure provision of 6401 discriminated in favor of women without sufficient justification. The Government sought review of the decision.

Issue:

Did 10 USCS 6382(a) unconstitutionally discriminate against the plaintiff based on sex?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the different statutory treatment of men and women officers, since the statutory classification was completely rational. According to the Court, the different treatment of men and women naval officers under §§ 6382 and 6401 resulted, not from mere administrative or fiscal convenience, but from the fact that female line officers because of restrictions on their participating in combat and most sea duty, did not have opportunities for professional service equal to those of male line officers. The Court held that Congress had acted within its broad constitutional power in establishing the discharge practice for male officers under § 6382(a). The operation of the statutes in question resulted in a flow of promotions commensurate with the Navy's current needs and served to motivate qualified commissioned officers to so conduct themselves that they may realistically look forward to higher levels of command.