Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs. - 451 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1970)

Rule:

A condition presenting an unreasonable risk of harm is defined as one in which there is a sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen it or some similar event as likely to happen. It follows that an owner or occupier of land can be charged with knowledge and appreciation of a dangerous condition on his premises only if from a reasonable inspection a reasonably prudent person should have foreseen a probability that the condition would result in injury to another. As might be expected with a matter involving the "reasonable man" concept, there seems to be no definitive, objective test which may be applied to determine whether a condition presents an unreasonable risk of harm.

Facts:

Plaintiff business invitee was at the owners' showroom when she caught her foot in a rug. She fell and broke her wrist. The room had several other rugs over an asphalt floor. The parties testified about the construction of the rug and said that there was nothing to call the invitee's attention to the rug. There was no evidence that anyone had previously tripped on the rug, and the construction of the rug was not unusual. The trial court entered an instructed verdict for the owners, which was affirmed by the lower appellate court. The invitee challenged the judgment of the lower courts. 

Issue:

Did the rug present an unreasonable risk of harm or a threat of danger that should have been known to and appreciated by the owners?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On further appeal, the court held that there was no evidence to support the invitee's claim that the rug presented an unreasonable risk of harm or that a threat of danger existed that should have been known to and appreciated by the owners. In affirming the lower appellate court's judgment, the court concluded that the trial court properly excluded evidence presented by the invitee that no other showrooms in the same trade mart used similar rugs because it was not probative of any material fact.