Ship Creek Hydraulic Syndicate v. Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities - 685 P.2d 715 (Alaska 1984)

Rule:

A decisional document reflects the facts and premises on which a decision is based. Thus, the one-sentence "statement" which Alaska Stat. § 09.55.430(7) requires a declaration of taking to include does not qualify as a decisional document. A decisional document should indicate the determinative reason for the final action taken; although detailed findings of fact are not required, the statement of reasons should inform the court and the private party of both the grounds of decision and the essential facts upon which the agency's inferences are based. If serious objections are raised in relation to action the agency proposes, the decisional document should respond to them. A decisional document, done carefully and in good faith, serves several salutary purposes. It facilitates judicial review by demonstrating those factors which were considered. It tends to ensure careful and reasoned administrative deliberation. It assists interested parties in determining whether to seek judicial review. And it tends to restrain agencies from acting beyond the bounds of their jurisdiction.

Facts:

Until 1953, the Territory of Alaska was required to file a complaint and obtain a court order for possession before it could use a landowner's property for a highway project. 57-7-1-23 ACLA 1949. In 1953, the Territorial Legislature authorized what has become known as the "quick-take" procedure, in which title to the property passes upon the filing of a "declaration of taking" and such matters as the necessity for a taking and the fair market value of the property taken are left for later determination. Ch. 90, SLA 1953. Twenty-two years later, this Court held that under the declaration of taking statute landowners had only limited rights to object to the authority and necessity for takings.  Responding to the court's decision, the Legislature amended the "quick-take" statute, requiring a condemning authority to state as part of its declaration of taking that "the property is taken by necessity for a project located in a manner which is most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." If this statement proves to be untrue, the superior court is expressly empowered to divest the condemner of title or possession. In State v. 0.644 Acres, More or Less, 613 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1980)("Cooper") and State v. 2.072 Acres, More or Less, 652 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1982)("Hodges"), the court held that statutory amendments required individualized consideration of the private injury a public project would cause each private landholder, and that in some cases this individualized consideration would have to include approximate cost estimates of alternatives to the proposed taking. By amending the statute, the court concluded, the Legislature had altered the summary nature of the "quick-take."

This procedure may now be became apparent when Ship Creek Hydraulic Syndicate, petitioner here, sought review of the superior court's refusal to set aside the taking of its Anchorage property. Ship Creek's objections had precipitated a four-day hearing, during which engineers debated the merits of the State's decision about where to locate the A-C Couplet, an Anchorage highway project.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside the taking of Ship Creek’s property by respondent Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT/PF/PF)?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed the trial court's decision but announced a new rule to be applied prospectively. The DOT/PF was required to file decisional documents that adequately reflected the facts and premises on which the decision was based in all condemnation cases. If a statute required reasoned decisions, and the legislature did not expressly or by implication limit judicial authority to decide how to review administrative action, the court could and should require agencies to explain their decisions. However, the landowner was not entitled to application of the new rule because requiring the DOT/PF to prepare a decisional document would not have served a useful purpose given that the document would inevitably have been affected by the parties' arguments before the court.