Silver v. Wilson (In re Estate of Silver) - No. 237134, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 1389 (Ct. App. June 12, 2003)

Rule:

Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used. If a term is not expressly defined in the statute, it is permissible for this Court to consult dictionary definitions as an aid to construing the term "in accordance with its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Further, nothing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as indicated by the act itself.

Facts:

Respondent Kathleen Wilson filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State in connection with a security agreement entered into that covered certain items, including equipment. Subsequently, respondent Mark Conti entered into a series of security agreements with respondent Silver Trust. In these security agreements, respondent Conti granted respondent-appellee a security interest in eleven pieces of artwork. Subsequently, respondent-appellee perfected its security interest by taking possession of the paintings. Accordingly, the probate court awarded these paintings to respondent-appellee. Respondents-appellants appealed as of right from the probate court's order awarding four paintings to respondent-appellee in partial satisfaction of respondent Conti's indebtedness to respondent Silver Trust.

Issue:

Was the painting an equipment rather than a consumer goods?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the four paintings at issue were used by respondent Conti primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and held that the four paintings at issue in this case are appropriately classified, instead, as equipment. The court then ruled that the paintings in dispute were equipment rather than consumer goods. Further, respondent’s security interest was perfected in these four paintings by the filing of her financing statement with the Secretary of State. As such, respondent’s claim for these paintings also has priority over the claim of respondent-appellee.