Smith v. City of Akron - 476 F. App'x 67 (6th Cir. 2012)

Rule:

A prerequisite of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) is that plaintiff made a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Adding new, previously unknown defendants in place of "John Doe" defendants is considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties, and such amendments do not satisfy the mistaken identity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The relation-back protections of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) were not designed to correct that kind of problem.

Facts:

On August 27, 2007, officers John Ross and Michael Miles, while on patrol in the City of Akron, began following Rashoun Smith, who was driving a stolen vehicle. Noticing the police car behind him, Smith stopped his car, exited and began talking with the officers. He told them the car belonged to a friend, whom he refused to name. The officers arrested Smith. According to Smith, he was cooperative during the arrest; the officers claimed that Smith resisted. Both parties agreed, however, that Ross and Miles wrestled Smith to the ground, punched and kneed him in his back, sprayed him with chemical spray and tased him before placing him in the police cruiser. Two years later, Smith filed a complaint in state court, claiming violations of the federal constitution and state tort law by "John and Jane Doe Nos. 1-10," the City of Akron, and the Akron Police Department. The city removed the case to federal court, after which Smith amended his complaint to add Ross and Miles as defendants in place of "John Doe" numbers one and two. Ross and Miles moved to dismiss the claims against them because Smith added them after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The district court granted the motion. Furthermore, the court granted summary judgment to the city defendants on Smith's remaining claims because his complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983 and because Ohio law forbade tort claims against municipal corporations engaged in governmental functions.

Issue:

1. Did the plaintiff’s amendment relate back to his original complaint? 
2. Did the plaintiff’s complaint allege facts sufficient to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The judgment of the district court was affirmed. According to the court, adding new, previously unknown defendants in place of "John Doe" defendants was considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties, and such amendments did not satisfy the mistaken identity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). In this case, plaintiff did not make a mistake about the identity of the parties he intended to sue (he did not know who they were and apparently did not find out within the two-year limitations period), and the relation-back protections of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) were not designed to correct that kind of problem. Also, at most, plaintiff's evidence supported the inference that the officers may have acted inappropriately, but not that the city trained them to act inappropriately or customarily allowed them to do so; thus, the 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against the city failed as a matter of law. Finally, an Ohio "governmental function" included the provision of police services or protection. Because the officers were acting as law enforcement officers at the time of plaintiff's injury, Ohio law immunized the city from those tort claims.