Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad - 225 N.J. 373, 139 A.3d 1 (2016)

Rule:

The key difference between a direct-evidence case and a circumstantial-evidence employment discrimination case is the kind of proof the employee produces on the issue of bias. The employee must set forth more direct evidence in a direct-evidence case than in a McDonnell Douglas case involving circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by, so the McDonnell Douglas test was developed to permit employees to prove discrimination using circumstantial evidence. In the rare case in which there is direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not apply. The production of direct evidence of unlawful discrimination destroys the presumption of good faith concerning employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Accordingly, direct evidence of discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it. 

Facts:

In February 2006, plaintiff Robert Smith, who was then employed as director of operations of defendant Millville Rescue Squad, was terminated from employment. This occurred shortly after he informed his supervisor that he was engaged in an affair with a volunteer worker, and that he and his wife, who also worked for the rescue squad, were separated and about to commence divorce proceedings. Smith testified that, when he informed his supervisor about the affair, the supervisor stated that he could not promise that it would not affect Smith’s job. At a subsequent meeting in February 2006, Smith’s supervisor stated that he believed that Smith and his wife would have an "ugly divorce." The supervisor further stated that he had to take the matter to the rescue squad's board. At the meeting, the board decided to terminate Smith’s employment. The minutes of the meeting referred to a corporate restructuring, Smith’s poor performance for some time, and the failure of efforts to remediate plaintiff's performance, as grounds for the termination. Millville Rescue Squad terminated Smith’s employment on the following day. Smith commenced suit against the rescue squad and his supervisor, asserting claims under the LAD and the State Constitution for wrongful discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status, and common law wrongful discharge. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court granted defendant's motion for an involuntary dismissal. On plaintiff's claim of marital-status discrimination under the LAD, the court found that plaintiff had failed to present evidence that he was terminated because he was either married or unmarried, or because he was having an affair, or any evidence that employees were treated differently based on their marital status. The court found that plaintiff's proofs showed that he was terminated because management was concerned about the likelihood of an acrimonious divorce, which the court held did not give rise to a marital-status discrimination claim. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's marital-status discrimination claim.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in finding that Smith failed to establish a prima facie case of marital-status discrimination in employment under the LAD?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The facts asserted by Smith, if assumed to be true, demonstrate that he was discharged "in significant part" based on his marital status. Smith was not merely terminated because of the identity of his spouse, an MRS employee. Smith was terminated based on his employer's stereotypes about the impact his divorce might have on the work performance of him and others. Smith testified that Redden's statements revealed his concern that the Smith divorce would be an "ugly divorce," even though there was apparently no evidence supporting Redden's concern. In fact, Smith testified that his divorce was amicable and not at all "ugly." Smith also stated that Redden told him that if he and his wife had been able to reconcile, Smith would not have been terminated. Defendants were not enforcing an anti-nepotism policy—in fact, defendants openly permitted Smith and his wife to work together—but instead terminated Smith because of invidious stereotypes about divorcing persons. Such discrimination is unlawful under the LAD. The trial court went awry when it evaluated Smith’s marital-status-discrimination claim through the prism of the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial-evidence analysis rather than the direct-evidence analysis. To be sure, some of the evidence presented by Smith does tend to establish unlawful discrimination by circumstantial evidence. Smith testified at length about his employment history, including promotions, regular pay increases, and the lack of any criticism or poor performance evaluations. Smith also highlighted his ability to control costs while maintaining the quality of the services provided by MRS. Moreover, there was not a shred of evidence that plaintiff's separation from his co-employee wife caused any disruption in the workplace. In fact, the evidence presented by Smith, which the trial court was obliged to accept as true, revealed that the divorce was prosecuted amicably and swiftly.  Smith, however, also presented direct evidence of discrimination, but the trial judge failed to evaluate the sufficiency of that evidence to avoid an involuntary dismissal. Smith’s case included Redden's facially discriminatory statements about divorcing persons, which clearly signaled that Smith was fired because of the demise of his marriage. Redden's statements in June 2005 and February 2006 reveal not only his displeasure about Smith’s fractured marriage but also his reliance on stereotypes about the manner in which divorcing employees conduct themselves in the workplace. Redden told Smith that he believed plaintiff and Mary would be undergoing an "ugly divorce" and that, had plaintiff been able to reconcile with his wife, he would not have been terminated. Having submitted direct evidence of discrimination, Smith was not required to satisfy the four McDonnell Douglas factors for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. Viewing that direct evidence in the light most favorable to Smith, the trial court should have denied defendants' motion and permitted the jury to render a verdict on Smith’s marital-status-discrimination claim.