Snyder v. Davis - 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997)

Rule:

It is clear that the homestead provision is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining the homestead property. As a matter of policy as well as construction, the homestead protections have been interpreted broadly. 

Facts:

Betty Snyder died testate. She was survived by her only son, Milo Snyder and his only daughter, Kelli Snyder. Defendant Kent W. Davis, the personal representative of decedent’s estate, sought to sell the homestead property to satisfy creditors' claims, to fund specific bequests, and to pay the costs of administration. Plaintiff granddaughter Kelli Snyder, the residuary beneficiary, asserted that the decedent’s homestead passed to her free of claims because she was protected by article X, section 4, of the Florida Constitution. There is no dispute that the home was homestead property for the purpose of distribution or that that said property was properly devised in the residuary clause of her will. The sole issue was whether plaintiff may be properly considered an heir under the homestead provision, qualifying her for protection from the forced sale of the homestead property when her father, the next-in-line heir under statutory intestate succession, is still living. Defendant argued that the homestead property was not protected by the homestead provision and thus, subjected to creditor’s claim. The district court found that testator could not both devise her homestead property to petitioner and preserve its exemption from creditors. Petitioner then sought review of the decision. 

Issue:

Did the homestead provision exempt from a forced sale a devise of homestead by decedent to a lineal descendant who was not an heir?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court found that while the homestead could be devised, the constitutional exemption from creditors would follow the homestead only if it were devised to the person or persons who would have actually taken the homestead had the testator died intestate. In this case petitioner would not have taken the homestead under the intestacy statutes because the testator's natural son was still alive at the death of the testator. The court found that the word heirs when determining entitlement to the homestead protections against creditors, was not limited to only the person or persons who would actually take the homestead by law in intestacy on the death of the decedent. Instead, the court held that the constitution must be construed to mean that a testator, when drafting a will prior to death, could devise the homestead if there was no surviving spouse or minor children to any of that class of persons categorized in the Intestacy Statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 732.103. Therefore, the decision of the district was quashed.