Spaulding v. Morse - 322 Mass. 149, 76 N.E.2d 137 (1947)

Rule:

Every instrument in writing is to be interpreted with a view to the material circumstances of the parties at the time of the execution, in the light of the pertinent facts within their knowledge and in such manner as to give effect to the main end designed to be accomplished. The instrument is to be so construed as to give effect to the intent of the parties as manifested by the words used illumined by all the attendant factors, unless inconsistent with some positive rule of law or repugnant to other terms of the instrument. An omission to express an intention cannot be supplied by conjecture. But if the instrument as a whole produces a conviction that a particular result was fixedly desired although not expressed by formal words, that defect may be supplied by implication and the underlying intention may be effectuated, provided it is sufficiently declared by the entire instrument.

Facts:

A written instrument of agreement was executed by the former husband, the former wife, and the original trustee. The agreement was established pursuant to the divorce of the son's parents. The trustee's bill in equity requested specific performance of the instrument by requiring that, pursuant to the agreement, the former husband resume making monthly payments to the trustee during the period in which the son served in the United States Army. The superior court ordered that the former husband continue making those monthly payments. The former husband appealed. 

Issue:

Under the circumstances, should the former husband be ordered to make monthly payments during the period in which the son served in the United States Army? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court reversed the contested decree and ordered a rescript to the superior court to dismiss the bill and award costs to the former husband. The court held that the parents' intention was that the agreement provide for the son's maintenance and education. The court found that the son's induction into the army prevented the fulfillment of those purposes of the trust. Therefore, the court interpreted the agreement as not requiring the trustee to perform the services required to maintain and educate the son during his service in the army. The superior court lacked the authority to order the making of payments not presently due and owed for future events.