Stanley v. Richmond - 35 Cal. App. 4th 1070, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (1995)

Rule:

The scope of an attorney's fiduciary duty may be determined as a matter of law based on the rules of professional conduct which, together with statutes and general principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define the duty component of the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his or her client. Whether an attorney has breached a fiduciary duty to his or her client is generally a question of fact. Expert testimony is not required, but is admissible to establish the duty and breach elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty where the attorney conduct is a matter beyond common knowledge. 

Facts:

Linda E. Stanley filed an action for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and breach of contract against Diana Richmond who represented her in a dissolution of marriage proceeding at the same time Richmond was in the process of forming a new law firm with Stanley’s husband's attorney, C. Rick Chamberlin. At the close of Stanley’s evidence in a jury trial, the trial court granted defendant's motion for nonsuit, ruling that Stanley was required--and failed--to present expert testimony on the applicable standard of care for family law attorneys, and that Stanley failed to present evidence that, but for defendant's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, Stanley would have obtained a better result in the dissolution proceedings.

Issue:

Did Stanley establish a prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. In so ruling, the appellate court noted that prior to the termination of the divorce proceedings, during which Richmond represented Stanley, Richmond began negotiations to form a partnership with the opposing counsel. During post-trial wind-up of the property division, Richmond gave Stanley erroneous advice to waive her rights in her ex-husband's pension, and did not consider tax consequences in dividing property. Regarding breach of fiduciary duty, Richmond’s expert's testimony was sufficient to establish that Richmond’s loyalty was impaired by her agreement to go into practice with opposing counsel. Regarding professional negligence and/or breach of contract, the appellate court held that the lack of expert testimony did not defeat the claim. In so ruling, the appellate court held that Richmond’s negligence was readily apparent.