State v. Anthony - 151 N.H. 492, 861 A.2d 773 (2004)

Rule:

Accomplice liability under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:8(III) (Supp. 2004) and N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:8(IV) (amended 2001) (Supp. 2004) requires proof (1) that the accomplice has intended to promote or facilitate another's unlawful or dangerous conduct, and (2) that the accomplice has acted with the culpable mental state specified in the underlying statute with respect to the result.

Facts:

Virginia Anthony was indicted on a class B felony charge of accomplice to cruelty to animals for allegedly assisting her husband, Michael Anthony, in binding a colt's four legs together with the purpose of leaving the colt on the ground, which caused the colt to suffer pain and injury. On the State's motion, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of accomplice to negligent cruelty to animals. The jury acquitted Anthony of the felony charge, but found her guilty of the lesser included offense.

Issue:

Is Anthony liable for being an accomplice to negligent cruelty to animals despite the original phrasing of RSA 626:8 and the ruling of the court in State v. Etzweiler which both state that a person could not be an accomplice to negligent homicide?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The 2001 amendment to RSA 626:8, IV was not enacted to alter the original intent of the statute, but rather to clarify it in response to Etzweiler. It now provides that a person could be an accomplice to a crime if the person acted with the culpable mental state specified in the underlying statute "with respect to the result." Thus, even though the current version of section IV provides that "to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense," RSA 626:8, IV, the legislature used the phrase "with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense" in the sense it was used in Etzweiler. The legislature did not intend to repeal the requirement that the accomplice "have as his conscious objective the bringing about of conduct that the . . . [underlying criminal statute] has declared to be criminal."  Indeed, this was implicit in section IV's reference to an "accomplice in conduct."