State v. B.H. - 183 N.J. 171, 870 A.2d 273 (2005)

Rule:

Courts must apply the standard of a "person of reasonable firmness" in determining whether duress excuses criminal conduct, and battered woman syndrome expert testimony is not relevant to that analysis. The evidence is relevant, however, to a defendant's subjective perception of a threat from her abuser and, in that respect, can be relevant to her credibility. It also helps in explaining why she would remain with her abuser and, therefore, why such a defendant ought not to be perceived as acting recklessly. If the complete defense of duress is rejected, the syndrome evidence may be relevant in connection with sentencing where it may be applicable to a defendant's mitigation argument under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-1(b)(4).

Facts:

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child for having engaged in sexual intercourse with her seven-year-old stepson. She was convicted notwithstanding her defense that she was a battered wife who acted under duress exerted by her husband. The trial court permitted her to present expert testimony about battered woman syndrome but restricted its content and use. On appeal, the appellate court disagreed with the limitations placed on that evidence and reversed her convictions. The State appealed. 

Issue:

Was the battered woman syndrome expert testimony relevant to a defendant’s duress defense under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9?

Answer:

Yes, with respect to the subjective component of the defendant’s duress defense.

Conclusion:

On further review, the state supreme court found that due to the particular requirements of the duress statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9, the trial courts had to apply a standard of a “person of reasonable firmness” in determining whether duress excused criminal conduct and battered woman syndrome testimony was not relevant to that objective standard. However, it also found that battered woman syndrome evidence was relevant to a defendant’s subjective perception of a threat from her abuser and, in that respect, was admissible to the extent it was relevant to her credibility, which involved a subjective standard. Accordingly, the court modified the appellate court’s judgment to instruct the trial court that it should charge the jury that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome was relevant to the subjective component of her duress defense, her credibility, but was not to be considered regarding the objective component of that defense, the reasonableness of her conduct.