State v. Broten - 836 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)

Rule:

Because statutes are read and construed as a whole, Minn. Stat. § 609.377 must be interpreted in light of the surrounding subdivisions. Section 609.377, subd. 1 defines malicious punishment, and § 609.377, subds. 2 through 6 provide the sentencing provisions for the offense. Section 609.377, subd. 2 classifies a defendant's crime as a gross misdemeanor if the punishment results in less than substantial bodily harm. Section 609.377, subds. 3 through 6 classify the crime as a felony depending on the level of bodily harm suffered by the child, the age of the child, and the prior offenses of the defendant. Malicious punishment of a child involving cruel discipline that causes only emotional harm or bodily harm that is less than substantial does not rise to the level of a felony. The legislature wanted to enhance the punishment for conduct evidencing unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances if it rises to the level of substantial bodily harm or great bodily harm; or if it is directed toward a child under the age of four and causes bodily harm to the head, eyes, neck, or otherwise causes multiple bruises to the body; or if it is committed within five years of certain previous crimes. Construing the statute as a whole, reading "anything less than substantial bodily harm" to include emotional harm does not create conflicting interpretations

Facts:

The child’s mother, appellant, Stephanie Ann Broten, shaved the child’s head, allegedly as a way of disciplining the child. The child was also forced to run outside wearing a diaper. Appellant was charged with one count of malicious punishment of a child in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1. She waived her right to a jury trial pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain appellate review of a pretrial ruling. The district court found appellant guilty, and the present appeal followed. The appellant argued that the district court erred when it determined that a conviction under the statute did not require proof of bodily harm. Appellant alternatively argued that, if proof of bodily harm was not required, the statute was unconstitutionally vague.

Issue:

1. Did the district court err when it determined that a conviction under the Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1 did not require proof of bodily harm? 
2. Was Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1 unconstitutionally vague? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The judgment was affirmed. The court held that the appellant’s conviction was proper because, construing the statute as a whole, reading "anything less than substantial bodily harm" to include emotional harm did not create conflicting interpretations. Further, if the legislature had intended for a conviction under § 609.377 to require proof of bodily harm, it could have easily included statutory language. Appellant’s conduct fell under the plain meaning of conduct prohibited by § 609.377, subd. 1, and thus was included in the core class of conduct prohibited. The statute was not unconstitutionally vague.