State v. Countryman - 572 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1997)

Rule:

The court reviews the district court's refusal to suppress statements de novo. The court nevertheless gives weight to fact findings because of the district court's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses. The court considers both the evidence from the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. The court utilizes a dual test in determining the admissibility of a defendant's inculpatory statements over a Fifth Amendment challenge. The court first determines whether Miranda warnings were required and, if so, whether they were properly given. Second, the court ascertains whether the statement is voluntary and satisfies due process. Miranda warnings are not required unless there is both custody and interrogation.

Facts:

Defendant Darla Countryman and her husband Ray Countryman left Des Moines in their pickup truck and drove to Nebraska where they stole a car. The next day Darla was found aimlessly wandering, confused and incoherent, in Morris County, Kansas, on a farm owned by Rex and Susan Osborne. Rex Osborne summoned authorities and Darla was taken by deputy sheriff Scott Coover to the sheriff's office where she spoke extensively with Vicki Hewitt, a police dispatcher. Hewitt did not understand the conversation as an inquiry into a crime, but rather as an effort to learn about Darla's identity. The conversation lasted from 11:30 p.m. on June 22 to approximately 2:15 a.m. on June 23. During this entire time Darla was not advised of her Miranda rights. During the conversation, Darla stated she had stolen a car. Darla provided no directly incriminating evidence concerning the murder of Madelyne Miletich and Dorothy Miletich, but did express concern for the Miletich sisters, mentioning that something bad had happened to them. On the basis of a separate investigation conducted by the sheriff's department, Darla was arrested for the theft of the car she and her husband had stolen in Nebraska. The car was seized and its search revealed more than $ 100,000 in bonds belonging to the Miletiches as well as checkbooks and credit cards. On June 25 Darla spoke with Coover after giving her warnings as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-76, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 723-25 (1966). At the same time, Darla signed a written waiver of those rights. She stated she had stolen a car and had been taking drugs. On June 26, after again being informed of her Miranda rights and signing a waiver, Darla was questioned again. She then told the officers about the death of the Miletich sisters and provided a written statement. Darla was charged with murdering the Miletich sisters. Darla challenged the district court's refusal to suppress evidence regarding statements she made during the four interviews on the basis of Miranda. 

Issue:

1. Did the lack of the Miranda warnings in the initial conversation between defendant and police officer render the statements made therein inadmissible? 
2. Were the defendant’s subsequent statements inadmissible? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) No.

Conclusion:

The court noted that Miranda warnings were not required unless and until defendant was in custody. The test for whether defendant was in custody included an examination of the language used to summon her; the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; the extent to which defendant was confronted with evidence of her guilt; and whether she was free to leave the place of questioning. In this case, defendant was found walking around a stranger's farm, confused and under the influence of drugs. The officers who took her in were rescuing her, not arresting her, and she accompanied them voluntarily. The questions asked of defendant were to determine her identity so that relatives and friends could be called. The three-hour length of the conversation did not render it custodial. Defendant was easy to understand, responsive, conscious of the meaning of her words, and in full control of her person. She was not in custody at this time. The court held that subsequent statements and waivers of her rights were voluntary; there was no evidence of physical or psychological pressure to elicit the waiver. There was no requirement that defendant be given a new warning at her next interviews.