State v. Hoyt - 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964)

Rule:

That which will constitute the heat of passion which will reduce what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter is such mental disturbance, caused by reasonable, adequate provocation, as would ordinarily so overcome and dominate or suspend the exercise of the judgment of an ordinary man as to render his mind for the time being deaf to the voice of reason; make him incapable of forming and executing that distinct intent to take human life essential to murder in the first degree; and to cause him, uncontrollably, to act from impelling force of the disturbing cause rather than from any real wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition. The provocation, in order to be sufficient in law, must be such as, naturally and instantly, to produce in the minds of persons, ordinarily constituted, the highest degree of exasperation, rage, anger, sudden resentment, or terror.

Facts:

Defendant Dona Edna Hoyt shot her husband with a revolver. At trial, defendant testified to an unhappy married life, and to frequent incidents where the victim beat or choked her and humiliated her in various ways. On the afternoon preceding the killing, defendant had gone to a tavern to pick up the victim, and he said several things to her and to others present which were humiliating and insulting. When they returned home, the defendant and the victim engaged in a fight, which culminated with the defendant shooting the victim. Defendant had requested that the jury be instructed with respect to manslaughter. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant challenged her conviction, contending that by the evidence, a jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt that she caused her husband's death without intent to kill and while in the heat of passion.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, should the jury have been instructed with respect to manslaughter? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that if the defendant’s testimony was believed, it could be found that her acts resulted from an emotional or mental disturbance produced by her husband's provocative conduct. The question would remain whether the provocation offered would have been sufficient in character and degree to cause the same result in an ordinarily constituted person. A jury might have found her guilty of heat-of-passion manslaughter and entertained a reasonable doubt of her guilt of second-degree murder. The manslaughter verdict should have been submitted. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. A new trial was ordered.