State v. Muro - 269 Neb. 703, 695 N.W.2d 425 (2005)

Rule:

In criminal cases where a defendant's conduct is alleged to have resulted in death, proximate cause has been defined as a moving or effective cause or fault which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the death and without which the death would not have occurred. Conduct is a cause of an event if the event in question would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, conduct is not a cause of an event if that event would have occurred without such conduct.

Facts:

Defendant Muro was charged by information with felony child abuse resulting in death under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707. Following a bench trial at which Muro testified on her own behalf, the district court entered an order finding Muro guilty of the charged crime. The court found that Muro knowingly and intentionally failed to provide necessary care, that the child’s condition worsened as a result, and that the worsening of her condition ultimately led to her death. The court specifically found that Muro's deprivation of care for the child contributed in a natural and continuous sequence to the child’s death. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the district court imposed the minimum sentence for a Class IB felony of imprisonment for 20 years. On appeal, Muro asserted that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction and that her sentence was excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Muro filed a petition for review before the state supreme court, arguing among other things, that the appellate court erred in ruling that the State provided sufficient evidence that any act or omission done by her was the proximate cause or resulted in the death of her child.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, did the State provide sufficient evidence to establish that Muro’s conduct was the proximate cause of the death of her child?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The Court concluded that while the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the finding that defendant knowingly and intentionally caused or permitted the child to be deprived of medical care, it was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that such deprivation caused the child's death. To establish that defendant's unlawful conduct was a proximate cause of the child's death, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for defendant's delay in seeking medical treatment, the child would have survived her preexisting traumatic head injury. The State did not meet this burden. The State proved only the possibility of survival with earlier treatment. A finder of fact could not have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that but for defendant's unlawful conduct, the child would have survived. Accordingly, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the child's death resulted from defendant's conduct.