State v. Scott - 278 So. 2d 121 (La. 1973)

Rule:

La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 464 provides that an indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.

Facts:

Defendant George "Scottie" Scott was charged by a bill of information with the unlawfully distribution of heroin in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:971(a)(1). The district court found him guilty and sentenced him to 23 years imprisonment. It has been suggested that there was an error patent on the face of the record in that the bill of information did not charge that the accused did "intentionally" distribute "a certain controlled dangerous substance, heroin, in violation of LSA 40:971(a)(1). Several bills of exceptions were also reserved.

Issue:

Was there an error patent on the face of the record?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court held that the strict construction of indictments has been decried as a blemish and inconvenience in the law which enabled more offenders to escape by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence. Thus, despite this caveat to judges, it remained a mandate in the law to draft indictments in such a manner that they satisfy the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and, at the same time, requirements for drafting the indictment should not create technical traps for district attorneys. Therefore, it was not necessary under these principles or under statutory guidelines for the indictment here to charge that the accused intentionally distributed heroin. The court then held that there was no error patent on the face of the record insofar as the validity of the bill of information was concerned. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. As to the six bill of exceptions that were reserved, the Court ruled that general criminal intent needed not be specifically stated. As La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11 provided that in the absence of qualifying provisions, the term intentional referred to general criminal intent. That, La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 472 stated that in offenses requiring only a general criminal intent, the indictment needed not allege that the act was intentionally done. As for one bill of exception, the judge found that as a prospective juror was unable to read and write English with sufficient facility, he was excused over an objection. The court also held that question of qualifications was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge within the bounds prescribed by law. As for another bill, a motion for mistrial was denied based on the allegation that women were improperly excluded from the general venire. However, Louisiana's provisions, requiring women to file a written declaration of their desire to be subject to jury service before they could be selected, impaired no right of the accused. As for another bill, defense counsel's objection that the punishment was cruel and unusual was overruled. The court found that the punishment imposed was within the limits of the statute.