State v. Shell - 501 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)

Rule:

Because Missouri's involuntary manslaughter statute does not explicitly consider a defendant's failure to act, a duty to perform the omitted act must be otherwise imposed by law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 562.011.4 (2000). A person is not guilty of an offense based solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. There are at least four situations that may give rise to a duty to act: (1) where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; (2) where the defendant stands in a certain status relationship to another; (3) where the defendant assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and (4) where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid. A defendant stands in a certain status relationship with the victim in cases where some act or omission on the part of the defendant either created or increased the risk of injury to another.

Facts:

 In January 2012, Defendant Jason Shell and James Eyman (Decedent) were planning to buy heroin. In text messages, Eyman told Shell that he had $40 to put toward the purchase. Combined with Shell’s $30, the men were able to purchase seven doses of heroin. Shell contacted his heroin dealer and purchased all $70 worth of heroin, to be paid back by Eyman when they met up later in the evening. After buying the heroin, Shell went to Eyman’s parents' house—where Eyman was living at the time—and picked up Eyman. The men went to Shell’s house, where they each injected themselves with heroin. Shell took three doses, while Eyman took four. Shell drove Eyman back to his parents' house around 11:00 p.m. Eyman went inside, told his mother that he was tired and going to bed, and went into his bedroom. At around 1:00 p.m. the next day, Eyman’s mother went to check on him because he had not gotten up yet. She discovered Eyman was dead. Detective William Parks went to the house and saw that Decedent had a puncture mark on his arm that was consistent with injecting heroin with a hypodermic needle. Eyman’s father told Detective Parks that Shell had gone out with Defendant the night before. Detective Parks seized Eyman’s cell phone and sent it to the cyber-crime unit, which revealed Eyman’s texts with Shell about their plans the evening before. A few days later, Detective Parks went to Shell’s workplace to talk to him about Eyman’s death. Shell agreed to talk to Detective Parks at a nearby police station. Detective Parks drove both himself and Shell to the police station. Pursuant to safety protocol, Detective Parks handcuffed Shell on the drive to the police station. When they arrived at the station, the men went to an interview room. Detective Parks read Defendant his Miranda rights, and Shell said that he understood his rights and waived them by signing a Miranda waiver form. Shell told Detective Parks about how the men planned to buy heroin, how he picked Eyman up and how they went back to his house and injected heroin. Shell said that he noticed that Eyman was nodding out and lethargic. The men drove to a movie theatre but decided not to see the movie. They returned to Shell’s house, where Shell offered Eyman to stay the night so that Shell could keep an eye on him. Shell was concerned with Eyman’s physical condition because of the amount of heroin that Eyman injected. Nonetheless, Eyman decided to return home because he had a curfew. After relating these details to Detective Parks, Shell also wrote a statement. Detective Parks took Shell back to work and told him he would be in contact. Subsequently, Shell was charged with distribution of a controlled substance and first-degree involuntary manslaughter. The indictment charged that Shell "recklessly caused the death of [Eyman] by providing [Eyman] with heroin, knowing [Eyman] intended to inject the heroin into his body." Thirteen days before trial, Shell filed a pro se motion for a continuance, seeking to replace appointed trial counsel with privately retained counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. The case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Shell guilty of distribution of a controlled substance and first-degree involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced Shell to concurrent terms of eighteen years' imprisonment for distribution and fifteen years' imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter. Shell appealed, arguing among others that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of involuntary manslaughter.

Issue:

Was the State able to adduce sufficient evidence to support Shell’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

Re: duty to act — the court could not conclude that Shell "created and/or increased the risk of injury" to EymAN. The present case is factually distinguishable from Voss, where the defendant played a much more active role in the victim's drug overdose. Unlike Voss, Shell’s role in Eyman’s heroin use was simply that of distributor. During Shell’s trial, there was no evidence that Shell suggested how much heroin for Eyman to use or that Shell actively helped Eyman ingest the drugs. While the court certainly did not condone Shell’s delivery of heroin to Eyman, the present case did not rise to the level of creating or increasing the risk of injury. Under this Court's holding in Voss, such a special relationship requires more than just delivery of the heroin. Therefore, the law did not impose a duty because Defendant did not create and/or increase the risk of injury to Decedent. Further, it was clear that Shell did not seclude Eyman. In fact, the evidence showed that Shell did the opposite—he returned Eyman to his parents' house, where Eyman interacted with his mother. Nonetheless, under Gargus, Shell may have had a duty to act if he voluntarily assumed the care of Eyman and Eyman was dependent upon Defendant for medical care. In Gargus, the victim was diabetic, unable to walk, confined to a bed. These particular facts, combined with the "egregious" circumstances giving rise to criminal liability, differ from the present case. Here, the court could not conclude that Shell voluntarily assumed the care of Eyman and that he was entirety dependent upon Shell for his medical care. While Shell and Eyman engaged in drug use together, various other facts established at trial supported this conclusion. After Shell dropped Eyman back at his parents' house, Eyman had a conversation with his mother. Eyman may have started a load of laundry, and then he told his mother that he was tired, said goodnight, and told her that he loved her. These facts, when considered in the context of Eyman’s entire evening, show that Eyman was not entirely dependent upon Shell. Furthermore, Shell was not the only person with whom Eyman had interactions after ingesting the drugs.

Re: reckless cause of death — Shell’s affirmative act was delivering heroin to Eyman. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shell was aware of the risk that Eyman’s death was probable as a result of injecting heroin. The evidence presented at trial, specifically the testimony of Dr. Mary Case, the forensic pathologist, established the following: she had seen many heroin overdoses; doctors are not permitted to dispense heroin; and heroin is highly addictive. Dr. Case did not specifically address whether or not the dose ingested by Eyman created a known probability that Eyman would die; rather, Dr. Case spoke generally about the inherent dangers of heroin use. Given the lack of concrete evidence establishing that the amount of heroin injected by Eyman created a substantial risk of death, it could not lead to a conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support Shell’s conviction. While the court recognized the concern of the heroin epidemic and the rise in deaths as a result of heroin use, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that death by injecting heroin is a "probability less than a substantial certainty.” Further, the court noted the factual differences between the present case and Voss, in which the defendant's affirmative acts were reckless. In Voss, the defendant's affirmative acts consisted of more than providing heroin to the victim. Beyond providing the drugs, the defendant also suggested the amount of heroin for the victim to use, helped the victim prepare the heroin by crafting a beer can and mixing the heroin with water and heating it, and loaded the heroin into a syringe. In the present case, there was no evidence presented to the jury that Shell played such an active role in Eyman’s heroin injection. To rule as the State suggests and hold that Shell acted recklessly simply by providing Eyman with heroin would create a per se involuntary manslaughter rule, which we are unwilling impose upon criminal defendants absent clear legislative intent.