State v. Sowell - 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (1999)

Rule:

The common law distinction between principals and accessories is that a principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent. A principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive. An accessory before the fact is one who is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration. An accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other's guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. The main difference between an accessory before the fact and a principal in the second degree is that the latter must be actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime.

Facts:

Respondent Brian Lamont Sowell was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of armed robbery, robbery, two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and first-degree assault for his involvement along with three other men in the robbery of his employer, Recycling Incorporated. Testimonies by witnesses indicated that respondent was the mastermind behind the robbery. Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed respondent’s convictions. According to the Court of Special Appeals, the evidence presented to the jury was not sufficient to support a finding that respondent was present at the scene of the crime, either constructively or actually. Therefore, under the common law rules relating to principals and accessories, the respondent should not have been convicted as a principal in the second degree. Certiorari was granted. 

Issue:

Was the evidence sufficient to establish that respondent was an accomplice either because constructive presence is not required to establish accomplice liability or because he was constructively present?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

On certiorari review, the court affirmed the reversal of respondent's conviction for armed robbery, robbery, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and assault. Conviction as a principal in the second degree required respondent's presence, either actual or constructive. Maryland retained the common law distinction between principals and accessories, and there was insufficient evidence to find that respondent was present, either actually or constructively, at the scene of the crime. A principal in the second degree was one who was guilty of a felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded, or encouraged its commission in his presence, either actual or constructive. Testimony at trial indicated respondent was the mastermind behind the robbery, but was driving his truck route while the robbery occurred. The alteration of the common law rule of accessoryship in relation to robbery was a legislative function. Although the court had abrogated certain technical procedural rules accompanying the doctrine over the years, the legislature had not followed suit in abrogating the entire doctrine, and the court declined to do so by judicial action.