State v. Thompson - 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)

Rule:

1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-182, is unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule contained in the Fla. Const. art. III, § 6. 

Facts:

On January 25, 1996, the State of Florida (the State) filed an information against Carol Leigh Thompson (Thompson), charging her with three criminal offenses which occurred on November 16, 1995. These offenses included robbery with a firearm, aggravated battery of a person over the age of sixty-five, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The robbery with a firearm charge was a first-degree felony punishable by life; the aggravated battery charge was a first-degree felony; and the firearm possession charge was a second-degree felony. After charging Thompson with these felony offenses, the State filed a notice of intent to have her sentenced as a "Habitual Felony/Habitual Violent Felony Offender/Violent Career Criminal" pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1995). The version of section 775.084 applicable in Thompson's case had been amended by the passage of chapter 95-182, which became effective on October 1, 1995. See Ch. 95-182, § 12, at 1675, Laws of Fla. Under chapter 95-182, sections 2 through 7 of which are entitled the "Officer Evelyn Gort and All Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act of 1995" (the Gort Act), the Legislature, among other things, created the "violent career criminal" sentencing category for certain criminal offenders. In sections 8 through 10 of chapter 95-182, the Legislature addressed several aspects of domestic violence.  In response to the State's notice of intent, Thompson filed a motion to preclude the trial court from sentencing her as a violent career criminal and to declare unconstitutional chapter 95-182, claiming that the chapter law violated the single subject rule. The trial court denied Thompson's motion, and she then entered a plea of nolo contendere conditioned upon her right to appeal that denial. On May 21, 1996, the trial court sentenced Thompson as a violent career criminal to forty years in prison on the firearm possession charge, with a thirty-year minimum mandatory term, and life in prison on the robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery charges, with all of the sentences to run concurrently with one another. Thompson appealed and, as stated above, the Second District reversed the trial court's determination and found that chapter 95-182 violates the single subject rule.

Issue:

Was chapter 95-182 violative of the single subject rule of the Florida constitution?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The court determined that ch. 95-182 was violative of the single subject rule because the various sections of 95-182 addressed two different subjects. The court approved the Second District's decision in Thompson and disapprove the Third District's decision in Higgs.