State v. W.R. - 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014)

Rule:

Under the due process clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, when a defense necessarily negates an element of a crime charged, the State may not shift a burden of proving that defense onto a defendant. To hold otherwise unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Consent necessarily negates forcible compulsion under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(6) in a prosecution for second degree rape under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.050(1)(a). The Washington Supreme Court overrules State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631 (1989), and State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759 (2006), to the extent they hold that the defendant bears the burden of proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Facts:

Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found W.R. committed rape in the second degree under RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a). The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.F. that occurred on January 2, 2011, while J.F. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. Both W.R. and J.F. were minors at the time. Throughout the police investigation, W.R. consistently denied ever having sexual intercourse with J.F. Shortly before trial, he admitted that they had engaged in sexual intercourse on January 2, 2011, but defended it as consensual. To support his defense, W.R. testified that J.F. had a crush on him and that the two had engaged in sexual intercourse on a prior occasion in July 2010. J.F. initially denied ever having sex with W.R. before the January incident. At trial, however, she admitted to having sex with W.R. on both occasions but insisted she did not consent to either. Although W.R.'s sister did not witness the alleged rape, she was in the vicinity when it occurred and testified that J.F. had a crush on W.R. The court did not find W.R.'s and his sister's testimony to be credible, noting W.R.'s evasive responses to questions and inconsistent story, and his sister's uncorroborated story and cavalier demeanor at trial. The court found J.F.'s testimony to be credible, and concluded W.R. committed rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual. W.R. conceded the allocation was consistent with our prior decisions in Camara and Gregory but argued these decisions were based on a flawed reading of United States Supreme Court precedent and violated his due process rights. Division One of the Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief, unpublished per curiam opinion, noting it was bound by the court’s decisions in Camara and Gregory. State v. W.R., noted at 171 Wn. App. 1019 (2012). 

Issue:

When the State charges the defendant under a rape statute that includes “forcible compulsion” as a necessary element of the crime, does due process forbid requiring a criminal defendant to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that the trial court committed reversible error because it violates due process under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 to assign a defendant the burden of proving consent as a defense to a charge of rape under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.050(1)(a) by forcible compulsion as defined by Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(6); once a defendant asserts a consent defense and provides sufficient evidence to support the defense, the State bears a burden of proving lack of consent as part of its proof of the element of forcible compulsion.