Stern v. Marshall - 471 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. App. 2015)

Rule:

Courts recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance rights. The elements are (1) that an interference with one's property or property rights occurred; (2) such interference was intentional and caused damage; and (3) the interference was conducted with neither just cause nor legal excuse. 

Facts:

J. Howard Marshall II (Marshall II) died on August 4, 1995, in Houston, Texas at the age of 90. He was survived by three heirs: his widow, Vickie Lynn Marshall (a/k/a Anna Nicole Smith) ("Vickie"), and two sons, J. Howard Marshall, III ("Marshall III") and E. Pierce Marshall ("Pierce"). On August 8, 1995, on a Petition for Probate of Foreign Testament filed by Pierce and Finley Hilliard (who were both named as executors in Marshall II's will), a Louisiana district court signed an Order for Probate of Foreign Testament and Codicil recognizing Marshall II's December 22, 1992 will and June 11, 1993 codicil as valid and ordering that Pierce and Hilliard be confirmed as testamentary co-executors to serve without bond and that letters testamentary are to be issued to Pierce and Hilliard. On August 16, 1995, Pierce and Hilliard filed—in Texas probate court—a joint Application for Probate of Will and Codicil and for Appointment of Independent Co-executors. In an amended application in the Texas probate court, Pierce and Hilliard further explained that the Marshall II's Living Trust was a Louisiana trust being administered by the Louisiana courts, but that there were interests of Marshall II's estate "involving claims peculiar to Texas" in need of administration in Texas. In the Texas probate proceedings, Marshall III filed a will contest and claims. Marshall III alleged that he and his father, Marshall II, entered a contract in 1980 under which Marshall III agreed to sell to Marshall II his Koch Industries stock. Marshall III asserted that, in return, Marshall II promised to treat Marshall III equally to Pierce and his family with regard to estate planning and property. Marshall III sued for breach of this contract, as well as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference, seeking damages, a declaration, and a constructive trust. With regard to Marshall II's will and codicil, Marshall III asserted that they were invalid based upon defects in their execution. Alternatively, Marshall III alleged that they were both executed as the result of undue influence. In the further alternative, Marshall III asserted that Marshall II lacked testamentary capacity when the will and codicil were executed. Marshall III similarly complained that the Living Trust and its amendments were executed as a result of undue influence and duress, such that transfers to the purported trusts should be invalidated. Marshall III requested that the Texas probate court deny the application for probate and impose a constructive trust on all Marshall II's property that had been transferred to others. On January 25, 1996, Vickie filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in California. Pierce filed a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy proceedings, alleging that Vickie had defamed him when her lawyers told the press that Pierce had engaged in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to gain control of Marshall II's assets. Pierce sought a declaration that his claim was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie asserted truth as a defense. Later, Pierce filed a proof of claim for the defamation, seeing to recover defamation damages in the bankruptcy proceedings. Vickie also asserted counterclaims against Pierce in the bankruptcy action, among them a claim that Pierce tortiously interfered with an intended gift from Marshall II. Vickie's counterclaims turned her objection to Pierce's claim into an adversary proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in Vickie's favor on Pierce's defamation claim and, after a bench trial, entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference counterclaim. While the Bankruptcy proceedings were pending in California, Vickie filed her own will contest in the pending Texas probate proceedings against Pierce and numerous other defendants. Vickie challenged the validity of Marshall II's Living Trust, and argued that trust could not receive assets under the residuary clause in Marshall II's 1992 will. On February 16, 2001, in compliance with a California Bankruptcy Court order declaring that defendants' Texas probate court tortious interference claims violated the bankruptcy court's discharge order and threatening contempt if those claims were not dismissed, those defendants dismissed the intentional interference claims against Vickie, leaving only the request for sanctions and request for declaratory relief.

Issue:

Was the probate court correct that, at the time of Vickie's nonsuit, the Marshall Family defendants had tortious-interference claims pending that qualified as affirmative claims for relief under Rule 162?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that because appellees had pending affirmative claims for relief in the form of tortious interference claims against Vickie, the probate court did not err in refusing to dismiss her from the underlying suit when she nonsuited her claims under Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. The trial court did not err in concluding that appellees demonstrated a justiciable controversy to support their request for declaratory relief; the requested declaration that Vickie had no agreement or contract for half of the decedent's estate fell within the plain meaning of the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b) (2014). While appellees claimed that the trial court decided the issue of one appellee's entitlement to attorney fees, such a determination was never requested by him; hence, he waived the issue and he was entitled to nothing on his claim.