Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. - 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky. 2004)

Rule:

Defamation by writing and by contemporary means analogous to writing is libel. Defamation communicated orally is slander. The gist of both torts is the injury to the reputation of a person in public esteem and thus prima facie cases for both torts require proof of: (1)defamatory language, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) which is published and, (4) which causes injury to reputation. Defamatory language is broadly construed as language that tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. It is for a jury to determine, on the basis of competent evidence, whether a defamatory meaning was attributed to it by those who received the communication. The terms should be construed in their most natural meaning and should be measured by the natural and probable effect on the mind of the average reader. A plaintiff need not be specifically identified in the defamatory matter itself so long as it was so reasonably understood by plaintiffs friends and acquaintances familiar with the incident. The notion of publication is a term of art, and defamatory language is published when it is intentionally or negligently communicated to someone other than the party defamed.

Facts:

Appellant employees were terminated for unauthorized removal of company property and for violating company policy by eating claims candy, which was candy from open or torn bags removed from the employer's store shelves. The employees brought suit against appellees, an employer and a supervisor, asserting claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy through violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 526, which criminalized conduct relating to eavesdropping. According to the employees, the appellees engaged in illegal surveillance before, during, and after their termination and defamed them through written and oral accusations that they were discharged for theft. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the employees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict in appellees' favor as to each of appellants' claims and reversed the trial court's judgment in its entirety.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, were the appellees entitled to directed verdicts with respect to all of appellant employees’ claims? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court upheld the appellate court as to intentional inflection of emotional distress and invasion-of-privacy/eaves dropping claim, but reversed as to the defamation claim. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to submit that claim to the jury as the employees demonstrated a prima facie case for common law defamation per se and it was not unreasonable for the jury to have determined that actual malice existed with regard to the statements made asserting that the employees had stolen the candy.