Strouth v. Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc. - 79 Conn. App. 55, 829 A.2d 102 (2003)

Rule:

In regard to a breach of contract, the standards of materiality are to be applied in the light of the facts of each case in such a way as to further the purpose of securing for each party his expectation of an exchange of performances. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 states circumstances, not rules, which are to be considered in determining whether a particular failure is material.

Facts:

Plaintiffs Robert Strouth et al., owners of a residence in West Suffield, contacted the defendant Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc. in May, 1998, because they were interested in having a swimming pool installed in their yard. Ed Carter, the defendant's salesman at that time, visited the property and met with the plaintiffs on May 19, 1998. After viewing a color brochure depicting various shapes for pools and spas, the plaintiffs decided on a peanut shaped pool with a circular six foot interior spa. They informed Carter of their choice. Carter drew a contract for the construction of a pool. The contract specified a "custom" shaped pool, forty feet long by twenty feet wide. Dennis Murphy, the defendant's president, arrived at the property on July 16, 1998, to commence excavation. He showed Caroline Strouth a picture of the kidney shaped pool he planned to dig and laid out staking. She told Murphy that the picture he was showing her did not look like the pool she was expecting. Murphy assured her that the pool would look like she expected it to when completed. The excavation was in the shape of a kidney. After the excavation was complete, a crew arrived to install the steel frame (rebar). An electrician and plumber also did work at the property. The rebars outlined an almond-shaped spa, not a circular spa.

After receiving a bill from the defendant for additional excavation time incurred because the defendant hit ledge on the first day of excavation, Robert Strouth telephoned the defendant to complain about the extra cost. He spoke to Joseph Murphy, the father of Dennis Murphy and an employee of the defendant. After a short, acrimonious conversation, Joseph Murphy abruptly terminated the conversation. Robert Strouth did not have an opportunity to complain that the pool was not excavated in the shape for which he and his wife had contracted. Four days later, Robert Strouth contacted the defendant and ordered it to discontinue all work at the property. Carter telephoned the plaintiffs several times to try to work out a completion of the pool. On September 20, 1998, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiffs in which it offered to complete the pool at the property with a circular spa. There was never an offer to reconfigure the pool in a peanut shape. The excavation remained, in a deteriorated condition, in the backyard.

In 1999, the plaintiffs brought the present action for breach of contract action. As to the defendant, they claimed damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and unfair trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The defendant filed a counterclaim, alleging breach of contract. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on the breach of contract claim and awarded damages in the amount of $ 10,618.63. The court rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs' claims of unjust enrichment and unfair trade practices, and for the plaintiffs on the defendant's counterclaim.

Issue:

Was the construction of a kidney shaped pool, when the contract called for a peanut shaped pool a material breach of the parties' contract so as to justify the plaintiffs in not performing their remaining duties under the contract?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Connecticut Supreme Court has approved the multifactor standards for materiality contained in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241. In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; and (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. The court, in its memorandum of decision, did not specifically apply the standards of materiality enunciated in § 241 of the Restatement. The court did, however, find that the construction of a kidney shaped pool would be a substantial deviation from the shape of the pool for which the plaintiffs contracted and that the plaintiffs "were not obliged to have a pool built in their backyard that did not conform to the pool for which they contracted." The court also found that although the defendant had offered to complete the pool with a circular spa, it never offered to reconfigure the pool to a peanut shape. Thus, it would appear that the court, essentially, focused on the criteria set forth in § 241 (a) and (d) to reach its conclusion that the construction of a kidney shaped pool constituted a material breach of the parties' contract. Under the circumstances, the court's conclusion was clearly not erroneous. Although the defendant argued that the construction of a kidney shaped pool would not deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit that they reasonably expected because the pool would still be fit for its intended use, the appellate court was not convinced that constructing a pool in the shape of a kidney, when the contract called for a pool in the shape of a peanut, would have constituted substantial performance.