Talley v. California - 362 U.S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536 (1960)

Rule:

An identification requirement tends to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.

Facts:

The Los Angeles City Ordinance forbade the distribution, in any place under any circumstances, of any handbill which did not have printed thereon the name and address of the person who prepared, distributed or sponsored it. The handbills in question urged readers to help the organization carry on a boycott against certain merchants and businessmen, whose names were given, on the ground that they carried products of manufacturers who will not offer equal employment opportunities to Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals. The Municipal Court held that the information printed on the handbills did not meet the requirements of the Los Angeles City ordinance in question, found the petitioner guilty as charged, and fined him $ 10. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction, rejecting petitioner's contention, timely made in both state courts, that the ordinance invaded his freedom of speech and press in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari. 

Issue:

Did the provisions of the ordinance in question abridge the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court held that Los Angeles, Cal., Mun. Code § 28.06, which barred distribution of "any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances," fell precisely under the ban of its prior cases unless the ordinance was saved by the qualification that handbills could be distributed if they had printed on them the names and addresses of the persons who prepared, distributed, or sponsored them. The court noted that the ordinance was in no matter so limited, nor had the court been referred to any legislative history indicating such a purpose. The ordinance simply barred all handbills under all circumstances anywhere that did not have the names and addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance required. The court further held that there were times and circumstances when states could not compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified because identification and fear of reprisal might have deterred perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. The court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.