Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield - 507 F. Supp. 2d 832 (S.D. Ohio 2007)

Rule:

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, and the evidence, together with all inferences that can permissibly be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The moving party may support the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other proof or by exposing the lack of evidence on an issue for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Facts:

Defendant Eric Benfield registered the internet domain name "www.TaylorHomes-Ripoff.com," referring to his website as a "gripe site" about the alleged failure of the Plaintiff Taylor Building Corporation of America (“Taylor”) to build his parents a quality home. On the website, defendant posted photos of the corporation's allegedly inferior workmanship and made unflattering remarks about the uncompleted house. Plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s website contained material that allegedly infringed upon the plaintiff’s service mark and contained false and defamatory information. Specifically, the complaint alleged claims for libel, tortious interference with contract/business relations, and misappropriation of service mark and trade dress. Defendant sought summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the protections afforded to him by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Issue:

Was the defendant entitled to summary judgment under the circumstances?

Answer:

Yes, only with regard to plaintiff’s Lanham Act and tortious interference with contract/business relations claims.

Conclusion:

The court found that two of five comments included on the website were actionable as libel per se because they made unsubstantiated false statements intended to injure the corporation's business reputation, i.e., that the house was not safe for human habitation and that the buyers were given no recourse for correcting substandard construction. The court further held that defendant’s statements were not protected by the qualified public interest privilege. However, the trade dress infringement claim alleging that the defendant’s use of a mark on the website to parody the plaintiff’s mark failed because the mark was not deceptive under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a). According to the court, the two marks were distinguishable and unlikely to cause confusion. The claims for tortious interference with contract/business relations were insufficiently supported by the pleadings.