Taylor v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty. - 24 Cal. 3d 890, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979)

Rule:

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in noncontract cases where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied. This has long been interpreted to mean that malice in fact, as opposed to malice implied by law, is required. The malice in fact, referred to as animus malus, may be proved under § 3294 either expressly, by direct evidence probative on the existence of hatred or ill will, or by implication, by indirect evidence from which the jury may draw inferences.

Facts:

Petitioner Taylor filed a civil action against defendant Stille for damages arising from an automobile accident. Petitioner’s complaint alleged that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. According to petitioner’s complaint, defendant acted with conscious disregard of plaintiff’s safety. In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff sought $100,000 in punitive damages. Defendant demurred to the complaint, contending that punitive damages could not be assessed against a negligent, intoxicated driver, at least in the absence of allegations to the effect that the driver actually intended to cause an accident or injury. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the complaint insofar as it sought recovery of punitive damages. Petitioner filed the present mandate proceeding. 

Issue:

Under the circumstances, could punitive damages be assessed against the defendant? 

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to overrule defendant's demurrer. The Court held that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of "malice" under civ. Code, § 3294, which authorized recovery of punitive damages in noncontract cases "where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied," if such act was performed under circumstances which disclosed a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. Rejecting defendant's contention that as an alcoholic he lacked sufficient volition to control his behavior and should be excused and not penalized for his involuntary conduct, the Court held that the question of volitional control or wilfulness was one of fact to be determined at trial. The Court also held that the fact that the drinking driver was the cause of so many of the more serious automobile accidents was strong evidence supporting the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents.